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Fifteen years ago, mass imprisonment was largely an invisible issue in the 
United States.  Since then, criticism of the country’s extraordinary incarceration 
rate has become widespread across the political spectrum.  The huge prison 
buildup of the past four decades has few ardent defenders at present.  But reforms 
to reduce the number of people in jail and prison have been remarkably modest so 
far.  
Meanwhile, a tenacious carceral state has sprouted in the shadows of mass 
imprisonment and has been extending its reach far beyond the prison gate.  It 
includes not only the country’s vast archipelago of jails and prisons, but also the 
far-reaching and growing range of penal punishments and controls that lie in the 
never-never land between the prison gate and full citizenship.  As it sunders 
families and communities, and radically reworks conceptions of democracy, rights, 
and citizenship, the carceral state poses a formidable political and social challenge. 
The reach of the carceral state today is truly breathtaking.  It extends well 
beyond the estimated 2.2 million people sitting in jail or prison today in the United 
States.
1
  It encompasses the more than 8 million people—or 1 in 23 adults―who 
are under some form of state control: including jail, prison, probation, parole, 
community sanctions, drug courts, immigrant detention, and other forms of 
government supervision.
2
  It also includes the millions of people who are booked 
into jail each year— nearly twelve million—and the estimated 7.5 percent of all 
adults who are felons or ex-felons.
3
  
                                                                                                                                                   
 
* This article is based on a revised and updated version of the concluding chapter of Marie 
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1   LAUREN E. GLAZE & ERINN J. HERBERMAN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 2013 3 (2014) [hereinafter 2013 
CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS REPORT], available at http://www.bjs.gov/content 
/pub/pdf/cpus13.pdf.     
2   State supervision ranges widely between the fifty states, from a high of one in thirteen 
adults in Georgia to a low of one in eighty-eight in New Hampshire.  PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, 
ONE IN 31: THE LONG REACH OF AMERICAN CORRECTIONS 10 (2009).   
3   There are an estimated 11.6 million jail admissions each year.  TODD D. MINTON, BUREAU 
OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JAIL INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2012 – STATISTICAL 
TABLES 4 (2013), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/jim12st.pdf.  But surprisingly, no 
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The carceral state directly shapes—and in some cases deforms—the lives of 
tens of millions of people who have never served a day in jail or prison or been 
arrested.  An estimated eight million minors—or one in ten children—have had an 
incarcerated parent.  Nearly two million minor children (under age 18) currently 
have a mother or father serving time behind bars.
4
  Millions of people reside in 
neighborhoods and communities that have been depopulated and upended as so 
many of their young men and women have been sent away to prison during what 
should be the prime of their lives.  
The problem of the carceral state is no longer confined to the prison cell, 
prison yard, or to poor urban communities and minority groups—if it ever was.  
The U.S. penal system has grown so extensive that it has begun to metastasize.  It 
has altered how key governing institutions, public services, and benefits operate 
everything from elections to schools to public housing.  The carceral state also has 
begun to distort essential demographic, political, and socioeconomic databases, 
leading to misleading findings about trends in vital areas like economic growth, 
political participation, unemployment, poverty, and public health.
5
 
The carceral state has been radically remaking conceptions of citizenship as it 
creates a large and permanent group of political, economic, and social outcasts.  As 
a result of criminal convictions, millions have been condemned to “civil death,” 
having been denied core civil liberties and social benefits.  An estimated six 
million people have been disenfranchised either temporarily or permanently 
because of a criminal conviction.  This is about 2.5 percent of the total U.S. voting 
age population, or 1 in 40 adults.
6
  Millions of Americans have been denied public 
benefits like student loans, food stamps, and public housing because of their 
criminal records.  Likewise, owing to a prior run-in with the law, many people are 
ineligible to receive state licenses for a range of occupations—from hairdressing to 
palm reading to nursing.  Many incarcerated mothers and fathers are at risk of 
having their parental rights severed, sometimes after they have been behind bars 
for as little as 15 months.
7
 
                                                                                                                                                   
official national statistics are collected on the number of people jailed annually (which is quite 
different from the number of annual admissions, since many people cycle in and out of jail).  
4   THE ECONOMIC MOBILITY PROJECT & THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, COLLATERAL 
COSTS: INCARCERATION’S EFFECTS ON ECONOMIC MOBILITY 18 (2010), available at 
http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/pcs_assets/2010/CollateralCosts1pdf.pdf.  
Jean M. Kjellstrand & J. Mark Eddy, Parental Incarceration During Childhood, Family Context, and 
Youth Problem Behavior Across Adolescence, 50 J. OFFENDER REHAB. 18, 186 (2011); PEW 
CHARITABLE TRUSTS, COLLATERAL COSTS: INCARCERATION’S EFFECT ON ECONOMIC MOBILITY 4 
(2010). 
5   See generally BECKY PETTIT, INVISIBLE MEN: MASS INCARCERATION AND THE MYTH OF 
BLACK PROGRESS (2012).   
6   CHRISTOPHER UGGEN, SARAH SHANNON & JEFF MANZA, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, STATE-
LEVEL ESTIMATES OF FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, 2010 1 (2012), available 
at http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/fd_State_Level_Estimates_of_Felon_Disen_2010. 
pdf.   
7   The 1997 Adoption and Safe Families Act puts strict time limits on reunification efforts for 
children separated from their parents and encourages states to terminate parental rights if 
2015] BRING IT ON  561 
 
 
For those seeking to dismantle the carceral state, the key challenge is not 
trying to determine what specific sentencing and other reforms would slash the 
number of people in jail and prison.  The real challenge is figuring out how to 
create a political environment that is more receptive to such reforms and how to 
make the far-reaching consequences of the carceral state into a leading political 
and public policy issue.
8
  
The carceral state is deeply entangled in the political, economic, and social 
fabric of the United States.  But in plotting a way out, we must guard against 
succumbing to “dystopian despair.”9  We need to resist the belief that the only way 
to raze the carceral state is to tackle the “root causes” of crime—massive 
unemployment, massive poverty, and unconscionable levels of social and 
economic inequality stratified by race, ethnicity, and gender.  Ameliorating the 
deeper structural problems that foster such high levels of inequality in U.S. society 
is an admirable goal.  But if the aim is to slash the country’s incarceration rate and 
undo its harmful collateral consequences over the next few years, not the next few 
decades, the root causes approach to progressive penal reform, however well 
intentioned, is shortsighted.  
Four decades ago, the United States had many of the same structural problems 
it has today—though not to the same degree—but it did not have such an 
expansive penal system.  Since then, the United States has embarked on a war on 
drugs and a broader war on crime characterized by penal policies unprecedented in 
modern U.S. history and unheard of or disdained in other advanced industrialized 
countries.  Experts on crime and punishment now generally agree that changes in 
public polices―not dramatic changes in criminal behavior—propelled the 
decades-long prison boom in the United States.
10
  In short, it was about the time, 
not about the crime.  The focus on structural problems overshadows the fact that 
numerous people are serving time today for nonviolent offenses, many of which 
are property or petty drug offenses that would not warrant a sentence in many other 
countries.  Many others are serving savagely long sentences for violent offenses 
even though they no longer pose serious threats to public safety.  
If we designate structural problems the centerpiece of any plan to dismantle 
the carceral state, we are essentially accepting that the extensive U.S. penal system 
is here to stay for a very long time.  After all, structural problems call for 
                                                                                                                                                   
reunification does not occur within a certain specified time frame.  About half of the states have 
enacted reunification statutes that apply to the children of imprisoned parents.  Candace Kruttschnitt, 
The Paradox of Women’s Imprisonment, 139 DÆDALUS 32, 35 (2010); VERNETTA D. YOUNG & 
REBECCA REVIERE, WOMEN BEHIND BARS: GENDER AND RACE IN U.S. PRISONS 111–12 (2006). 
8   See generally Marc Mauer, Sentencing Reform: Amid Mass Incarcerations—Guarded 
Optimism, 26 CRIM. JUST. 27 (2011). 
9   Adam Gopnick, The Caging of America: Why Do We Lock Up So Many People?, THE NEW 
YORKER, Jan. 30, 2012, at 21, available at http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2012/01/30/the-
caging-of-america.   
10  See COMMITTEE ON CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF HIGH RATES OF INCARCERATION ET 
AL., THE GROWTH OF INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES: EXPLORING CAUSES AND 
CONSEQUENCES chs. 3–5 (2014) (Jeremy Travis, Bruce Western & Steve Redburn, eds.). 
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comprehensive, often expensive, long-term solutions and commitments.  Long-
term fixes are problematic not just because they take a long time, but also because 
they are harder to sustain from one change of administration to the next (especially 
in the United States, which lacks a respected, expert, and politically insulated civil 
service).  Furthermore, as elaborated below, a focus on structural problems 
conflates two problems that are actually quite distinct—the problem of mass 
incarceration and the problem of crime. 
Major decarcerations that have occurred in other places and at other times 
came about primarily as a result of comprehensive changes in penal policy, rather 
than by mounting a sustained attack on structural problems and the root causes of 
crime.
11
  The package of penal policies based on the 3-R model that prevails in 
elite policy circles today—that is, reentry, justice reinvestment, and reducing 
recidivism—is not up to the task.  It has created a lot of motion but no major 
movement in razing the carceral state or considerably reducing the incarceration 
rate.
12
  
The changes needed in penal policy in order to slash the country’s 
incarceration rate are no mystery.  While reentry should be a priority, we cannot 
focus only on those who are being released.  We need to reduce the number of 
people who are sent to jail or prison and to decrease in sentence lengths and time 
served.  In short, we need comprehensive sentencing reform guided by the 
principle that prison should be reserved primarily for people who pose grave 
threats to society.
13
  Many leading policy makers are still acting as though “they 
can reduce the size of the prison population without directly taking on the rate and 
length of sentences.”14  They have deliberately pursued a strategy based on no 
fundamental changes in sentencing laws.  That has begun to change.
15
  But the 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
11  Rosemary Gartner, Anthony N. Doob & Franklin E. Zimring, The Past as Prologue? 
Decarceration in California Then and Now, 10 CRIMINOLOGY & PUBLIC POL’Y, 291, 291–92 (2011); 
Tapio Lappi-Seppälä, Sentencing and Punishment in Finland: The Decline of the Repressive Ideal, in 
PUNISHMENT AND PENAL SYSTEMS IN WESTERN COUNTRIES 146 (Michael Tonry & Richard Frase eds., 
2001); Claudius Messner & Vincenzo Ruggiero, Germany: The Penal System Between Past and 
Future, in WESTERN EUROPEAN PENAL SYSTEMS: A CRITICAL ANATOMY 128 (Vincenzo Ruggiero, 
Mick Ryan & Joe Sim eds., 1995); John Graham, Decarceration in the Federal Republic of 
Germany: How Practitioners are Succeeding Where Policy-Makers Have Failed, 30 BRIT. J. 
CRIMINOLOGY 150, 166–69 (1990).  
12  For more on the limits of the 3-R strategy, see MARIE GOTTSCHALK, CAUGHT: THE PRISON 
STATE AND THE LOCKDOWN OF AMERICAN POLITICS chs. 4–5 (2015). 
13  For a detailed analysis of the need for comprehensive sentencing reform, see generally 
MICHAEL TONRY, PUNISHING RACE: A CONTINUING AMERICAN DILEMMA (2011). 
14  Todd R. Clear & James Austin, Reducing Mass Incarceration: Implications of the Iron Law 
of Prison Populations, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 307, 313 (2009).  See also TODD R. CLEAR & 
NATASHA A. FROST, THE PUNISHMENT IMPERATIVE: THE RISE AND FAILURE OF MASS INCARCERATION 
IN AMERICA ch. 7 (2014).    
15  Compare the comments of Marc Levin of the Texas Public Policy Foundation in Terry 
Carter, Prison Break: Budget Crises Drive Reform, But Private Jails Press On, ABA JOURNAL (Oct. 
1, 2012, 9:50 AM), available at http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/prison 
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limited sentencing reforms enacted so far have been directed almost exclusively at 
the non, non, nons—that is, the nonserious, nonviolent, non-sex related 
offenders.
16
  And many state officials and policy makers have fiercely resisted 
applying these modest reforms retroactively to people already serving time.   
Comprehensive sentencing reform directed at reducing the time served for a 
wider range of offenders is necessary.  But it is not enough.  The country’s high 
incarceration rate is just one facet of the problem of the carceral state.  Another is 
that too many people are serving time in U.S. jails, prisons, and detention centers 
that are abusive and degrading.  These facilities need to be opened up to 
independent oversight to ensure that all prisoners and detainees are housed in safe, 
healthy environments that are respectful of human dignity.  But we also need to 
begin laying the political groundwork for a constitutional amendment that 
enshrines respect for human dignity in the U.S. Constitution, as Jonathan Simon 
implores.  The Eighth Amendment has proved to be scant protection against the 
degrading and abusive practices and conditions that prevail in too many U.S. jails 
and prisons.
17
  
Comprehensive sentencing reform also will not rectify the enormous harm 
caused by the prison beyond the prison and the stark and pernicious gradations of 
citizenship that the carceral state has created.  The widespread practice of 
condemning people with criminal records to “civil death” must be halted.  Most of 
the barriers to receiving critical public services, such as public housing, student 
loans, and welfare, and to participating in civic life, including voting and jury duty, 
must be eliminated.  Employment and licensing restrictions levied on ex-offenders 
should be narrowly tailored and reserved for very specific instances of compelling 
public safety concerns.  The criminalization of immigration policy must end, and 
the creeping merger of the law enforcement and immigration enforcement systems 
needs to be reversed.
18
  
                                                                                                                                                   
_break_budget_crises_drive_reform_but_private_jails_press_on/, with his testimony in 2013 and 
2014 criticizing mandatory minimums and calling for specific changes to reduce the proliferation of 
new laws and penalty enhancements in Texas in  Reevaluating the Effectiveness of Federal 
Mandatory Minimum Sentences: Hearing Before the Senate Judiciary Comm. (2013) (Statement of 
Marc Levin) and Levin: Create New Barriers in House Rules to New Crimes, Penalty Enhancements, 
GRITS FOR BREAKFAST (Oct. 8, 2014), http://gritsforbreakfast.blogspot.com/2014/10/levin-create-
new-barriers-in-house.html.   
16  See, e.g., Cara Sullivan, ALEC Passes Model Policy to Encourage Smarter Sentencing, 
AMERICAN LEGISLATOR (Oct. 1, 2013), http://www.americanlegislator.org/alec-passes-model-policy-
encourage-smarter-sentencing/; PAUL RYAN, BUDGET COMM. OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPS., 
EXPANDING OPPORTUNITY IN AMERICA: A DISCUSSION DRAFT FROM THE HOUSE BUDGET COMMITTEE 
54–60 (2014). 
17  Jonathan Simon, Professor of Law at UC Berkeley, Remarks at The Coming Decarceration 
Panel at the Annual Meeting of the American Association of Law Schools (Jan. 4, 2014) (notes taken 
by author during the panel); see also JONATHAN SIMON, MASS INCARCERATION ON TRIAL: A 
REMARKABLE COURT DECISION AND THE FUTURE OF PRISONS IN AMERICA (2014).  
18  For more on the carceral state and the criminalization of immigration enforcement policy, 
see GOTTSCHALK, supra note 12, at ch. 10. 
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Major reforms in penal policy and law enforcement are necessary to slash the 
incarceration rate and begin dismantling the carceral state.  In pursuing such 
reforms, we need to be clear that this will not resolve the crime crisis that persists 
in the United States despite the record crime drop of the past two decades.  
National crime rates are at nearly their lowest levels in half a century, but crime in 
poor communities―especially poor urban neighborhoods that are predominantly 
African-American—remains a major social problem.   
The crime crisis is directly related to deeper structural problems in ways that 
the crisis of the carceral state is not.  The only legitimate long-term solution to this 
crime crisis is to alleviate the root causes of vast and growing inequalities in the 
United States.  It goes without saying that this is going to take a long time and will 
require a major political struggle.  But in the meantime, there is no compelling 
public safety justification for keeping so many people from poor communities 
locked up.    
If we are serious about dismantling the carceral state the necessary policy 
changes are fairly straightforward, but the politics are not.  As Glenn Loury and 
Bruce Western note, the “most challenging policy problems are not merely 
technical.”19  Issues of crime and punishment are so vexing because they are 
inextricably bound up with judgments about morality, how social benefits and 
burdens should be allocated, the proper reach of the government, and what kind of 
democratic society the United States is, was, and will be.
20
  And all of these issues 
are to varying degrees tarnished by the patina of the country’s troubled racial 
history.  
 
I. WHAT DOESN’T WORK 
 
What is persistently missing in much of the current debate over mass 
incarceration and penal reform is any kind of inspiring, long-term vision against 
which the necessary short-term goals and strategic compromises can be 
measured.
21
  In plotting an escape from the carceral state, we need to “distinguish 
between mere surface scratches on a policy that is otherwise intact and deep 
fissures in the core of the policy itself” that might mark the beginning of the end of 
the carceral state.
22
  
The total number of people in U.S. jails and prisons has largely stabilized 
since the onset of the Great Recession, but no major contraction appears in sight.  
                                                                                                                                                   
 
19  Glenn C. Loury & Bruce Western, The Challenge of Mass Incarceration in America, 139 
DÆDALUS, 5, 5–7, (2010). 
20  IAN LOADER & RICHARD SPARKS, PUBLIC CRIMINOLOGY? 108 (2011). 
21  I am borrowing here from Strolovitch’s description of what constitutes a utopian vision. 
DARA Z. STROLOVITCH, AFFIRMATIVE ADVOCACY: RACE, CLASS, AND GENDER IN INTEREST GROUP 
POLITICS 234–36 (2007). 
22  Cheryl Marie Webster & Anthony N. Doob, America in a Larger World: The Future of the 
Penal Harm Movement, 7 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 473, 483 (2008). 
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In 2009, the total incarcerated population fell in the United States for the first time 
since the early 1970s.  It has continued to drop each year, but the rate of decrease 
has slowed considerably.  Between 2009 and 2013, the total number of people in 
prison and jail fell by just 3.4 percent, or about 77,000 people.
23
  California, which 
has been under enormous political and legal pressure to reduce its prison 
population thanks to the 2011 Brown v. Plata decision, accounts for more than 
forty percent of this drop.
24
  The number of inmates in state prisons has continued 
to grow in about half of the states, while declining slightly in the other half.
25
  In 
2013, the federal prison population, which has increased more than eightfold since 
1980, fell by less than 1 percent.  This was the first decrease in more than three 
decades.  That drop was more than offset in 2013 by a rise in the state prison 
population for the first time since 2009.
26
  Marc Mauer of The Sentencing Project 
calculated that if declines in the prison population continue at a rate of about 1.8% 
a year, the biggest year-to-year drop registered since the boom began, it will take 
until 2101—or nearly nine decades—for the prison population to return to its 1980 
level.
27
  Declines in the jail population have been steeper.  Since peaking in 2008, 
the total number of people in jail fell by nearly seven percent as of 2013.
28
    
The fallout from the Great Recession and the 2008 financial crisis provided an 
opportunity to redirect U.S. penal policy that opponents of the prison boom should 
continue to exploit.  But framing the problem of the carceral state as primarily an 
economic one will not sustain the political momentum needed over the long haul to 
drastically reduce the prison population and will have other negative 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
23  Calculated from 2013 CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS REPORT supra note 1 at 2 tbl.1 
(2014) and LAUREN E. GLAZE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 2009 2 tbl.1 (2010) [hereinafter, 2009 
CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS REPORT], available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ 
cpus09.pdf. 
24  In 2013, California had a total prison and jail population of nearly 219,000, a drop of 
around 33,000 inmates since 2009.  See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 2012 6 tbl.6; 2013 CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS 
REPORT, supra note 23, at 11 app. tbl. 1; TODD D. MINTON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF 
JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, JAIL INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2012: STATISTICAL TABLES 2 
(2013), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/jim12st.pdf.   
25  More Than Half of States Cut Imprisonment Rates from 2006 to 2011, THE PEW 
CHARITABLE TRUSTS (Mar. 8, 2013), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/about/news-room/press-
releases/2013/03/08/us-prison-count-continues-to-drop; E. ANN CARSON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 2013 4 (2014), available at 
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p13.pdf. 
26  See CARSON, supra note 25; CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 2012 12 
app. tbl.2 [hereinafter 2012 CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS REPORT]. 
27  The 1.8% decline was for 2012.  Marc Mauer & Nazgol Ghandnoosh, Can We Wait 88 
Years to End Mass Incarceration?, HUFF. POST (Dec. 20, 2013, 3:40 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/marc-mauer/88-years-mass-incarceration_b_4474132.html. 
28  TODD D. MINTON & DANIELA GOLINELLI, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, JAIL INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2013: STATISTICAL TABLES, 6 tbl.1 (2013), available at 
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/jim12st.pdf. 
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consequences.
29
  It denies the reality that punishment in any society is never a 
purely rational act.  Punishment is a means to regulate deviance.  But it is also an 
expressive act “in which society talks to itself about its own moral identity,” 
explains Philip Smith, channeling Durkheim.
30
  
Successful decarceration will cost money.  The people reentering society after 
prison need significant educational, vocational, housing, health, and economic 
support to ensure that the communities they are returning to are not further 
destabilized by waves of former prisoners.  It is more expensive to process young 
people in the juvenile court system rather than to transfer them to adult court.
31
  If 
we are serious about alternatives to incarceration, then community-based mental 
health and substance abuse programs will need major cash infusions so that the 
penal system is no longer the primary line of defense to address these major public 
health problems.  
A penal reform agenda delineated primarily by evidence-based research about 
“what works” will inevitably yield an agenda that is highly constrained and 
politically vulnerable.  “What works” has a poor track record when it comes to 
engineering important shifts not just in penal policy, but all kinds of public 
policy.
32
  In fact, a major preoccupation of scholars of public policy is seeking to 
explain why good scientific evidence often loses out in the contest against bad 
public policy.  Just look at the tragedy of climate change.  The fixation on 
emphasizing technocratic, expert-driven solutions to the problem of the carceral 
state denies the fundamental role that politics, emotion, and culture play in meting 
out punishment and in defining good and bad penal policy.  Appeals to science are 
incapable of articulating a “public ideal around which reform can be 
mobili[z]ed.”33  
Furthermore, as Todd Clear emphasized in his 2009 presidential address to 
the American Society of Criminology, the “evidence-based policy paradigm is, at 
its core, extraordinarily conservative.”  The “what works” model is based on a 
narrowly constructed understanding of what counts as evidence―program 
evaluations based on the gold standard of multiple randomized trials.  Such a 
narrow construction of evidence resting on what has already been shown to work 
fosters a “kind of slavery of the present.”  It also contributes to a denigration of 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
29  See GOTTSCHALK, supra note 12, at ch. 2.    
30  PHILIP SMITH, PUNISHMENT AND CULTURE 16 (2008). 
31  Mosi Secret, States Prosecute Fewer Teenagers in Adult Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2011, 
at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/06/nyregion/06juvenile.html. 
32  Roger Hood, Criminology and Penal Policy: The Vital Role of Empirical Research, in 
IDEOLOGY, CRIME AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: A SYMPOSIUM IN HONOR OF SIR LEON RADZINOWICZ 153–
57 (Anthony Bottoms & Michael Tonry eds., Willan 2002); Michael Tonry & David A. Green, 
Criminology and Public Policy in the USA and UK, in THE CRIMINOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF PENAL 
POLICY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF ROGER HOOD 485–525 (Lucia Zedner & Andrew Ashworth eds., 
2003). 
33  Adrian Cherney, Beyond Technicism: Broadening the ‘What Works’ Paradigm in Crime 
Prevention, 4 CRIME PREVENTION & COMMUNITY SAFETY, 49, 53 (2002). 
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other kinds of knowing and evidence that are not the result of controlled 
experiments, including policy studies and qualitative work.
34
   
A penal reform agenda defined primarily by attacking racial bias and racial 
disparities in the criminal justice system, especially the war on drugs, racial 
profiling, and stop-and-frisk, will also not bring about the demise of the carceral 
state.
35
  Even if every drug offender were released today, the United States would 
still have a sky-high incarceration rate.  Furthermore, a movement to challenge the 
carceral state centered on black-white disparities in the criminal justice system 
ignores how the carceral state has been extending its reach to other marginalized 
groups, including immigrants, poor whites, and people charged with sex offenses.
36
  
The racial disparities issue cannot be understood separately from key features of 
the wider political and economic context in which the carceral state was built.  
These include the ascendance of neoliberalism, growing economic inequalities 
among blacks, and the emergence of a new generation of post-racial African-
American leaders.
37
   
The causes of extreme levels of racial disparity in the U.S. penal system 
(including the war on drugs, racial profiling, pernicious racial and ethnic 
stereotypes, and the savagely long sentences meted out for offenses that African 
Americans disproportionately commit) “are unjust and objectionable in 
themselves,” as Michael Tonry argues.  But it is the severity of sentences, not the 
disparities in sentences, “that does the most damage.”38  Tonry calculates that if 
imprisonment rates were reduced to their levels in 1980, the black imprisonment 
rate would fall by two-thirds, and 700,000 fewer blacks would be in prison even 
though racial disparities in imprisonment would remain unchanged at about 5 to 
1.
39
  
For penal reformers troubled by the racial injustices of the criminal justice 
system, it is politically more challenging to put calls for across-the-board cuts in 
sentence lengths ahead of attacking policies that are so nakedly discriminatory, 
such as racial profiling, stop-and-frisk, and the war on drugs.  It also is politically 
more challenging to formulate a nuanced argument in defense of people who 
committed serious or violent offenses and are serving such lengthy sentences even 
though they no longer pose serious threats to society.
40
  Steven Raphael and 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
34  Todd R. Clear, Policy and Evidence: The Challenge to the American Society of 
Criminology: 2009 Presidential Address to the American Society of Criminology, 48 CRIMINOLOGY 1, 
6–7 (2010). 
35  See GOTTSCHALK, supra note 12, at ch. 2.   
36  See id. at chs. 6, 9, and 10.  
37  See generally GOTTSCHALK supra note 12.  
38  TONRY, supra note 13, at 145. 
39  Id. at 16–17.  
40  There is a precedent for this.  The leading opponents of the death penalty made an 
important strategic decision in the mid-1960s.  They shifted from challenging capital punishment 
primarily on a case-by-case basis on procedural grounds, many of them related to race, to launching a 
broad challenge to the constitutionality of the death penalty even though black defendants bore a 
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Michael Stoll calculate that rolling back punishments for violent offenses to their 
1984 levels would have reduced the state imprisonment rate in 2004 from about 
500 per 100,000 residents to about 350 per 100,000 residents, or a decrease of 
thirty percent.
41
  
 
II. SENTENCING REFORM 
 
Prisons and jails exacerbate many social ills that contribute to crime and 
poverty and are unlikely to significantly rehabilitate anyone.  The findings of two 
centuries of research on mandatory sentences are compelling.  Mandatory 
sentences do not serve as major deterrents to crime but do contribute to wide 
unwarranted disparities in punishment, especially racial disparities.
42
  We need to 
repeal mandatory minimums, truth-in-sentencing, and habitual offender laws, 
including three-strike statutes.  We need to rein in sex offender registration, 
notification, and civil commitment laws.  We also need to reinvigorate the parole 
process and insulate it from politics to ensure that every offender is entitled to a 
meaningful parole review, including everyone serving a life sentences.  
Furthermore, the bail bond system must be overhauled so that ability to pay is no 
longer the deciding factor in whether or not someone languishes in jail until his or 
her case is settled.
43
   
Momentum has been growing for sentencing reform, though much of it has 
been focused on the non, non, nons.  In May 2013, Congress created a bipartisan 
task force to pare down the criminal code with an eye toward reducing the number 
of people in federal prisons and reversing the encroachment of federal law 
enforcement into areas traditionally handled by the states.  The following month, 
Pew released a report highlighting how increases in time served have been a major 
contributor to the rise in incarceration rates.
44
  The report called for some modest 
                                                                                                                                                   
disproportionate burden of the death penalty.  See MARIE GOTTSCHALK, THE PRISON AND THE 
GALLOWS: THE POLITICS OF MASS INCARCERATION IN AMERICA 208–12 (2006). 
41  STEVEN RAPHAEL & MICHAEL A. STOLL, WHY ARE SO MANY AMERICANS IN PRISON? 80– 81 
(2013).  
42  See generally Michael Tonry, The Mostly Unintended Effects of Mandatory Penalties: Two 
Centuries of Consistent Findings, 38 CRIME & JUST. 65 (2009); Traci Schlesinger, The Failure of 
Race Neutral Policies: How Mandatory Terms and Sentencing Enhancements Contribute to Mass 
Racialized Incarceration, 57 CRIME & DELINQ. 56 (2011). 
43  See also MELISSA NEAL, JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE, BAIL FAIL: WHY THE U.S. SHOULD END 
THE PRACTICE OF USING MONEY FOR BAIL (2012),  available at 
http://www.justicepolicy.org/uploads/justicepolicy/documents/bailfail.pdf; SPIKE BRADFORD,  
JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE, FOR BETTER OR FOR PROFIT: HOW THE BAIL BONDING INDUSTRY STANDS IN 
THE WAY OF FAIR AND EFFECTIVE PRETRIAL JUSTICE (2012), available at  
http://www.justicepolicy.org/uploads/justicepolicy/documents/_for_better_or_for_profit_.pdf. 
44  According to the Pew report, offenders released from state prison in 2009 served on 
average three years, which is 9 months or 36 percent longer than offenders released in 1990.  These 
average figures mask great variations between the states.  THE PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, TIME 
SERVED: THE HIGH COST, LOW RETURN OF LONGER PRISON TERMS 3 (2012), available at 
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/realignment/docs/Report-Prison_Time_Served.pdf. 
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sentencing reforms directed primarily at nonviolent offenders.  Months later, 
Senator Rand Paul (R-KY) created a sensation at a Senate hearing when he likened 
the war on drugs to Jim Crow and characterized low-level drug offenders as 
victims.
45
  In January 2014, the Democrat-controlled Senate Judiciary Committee 
approved the Smarter Sentencing Act by a 13-to-5 vote with the support of Tea 
Partiers on the committee but not establishment Republicans.  The measure would 
cut some drug-related mandatory minimums in half, but the penalties still remain 
stiff—two, five, and ten years—and would not be applied retroactively.  However, 
the act would modify the 2010 Fair Sentencing Act to make it somewhat 
retroactive.  In a major shift, the U. S. Sentencing Commission agreed in July 2014 
to make recent changes in the guidelines for drug offenses retroactive.  Nearly 
50,000 federal drug offenders now serving time will be eligible for reduced 
sentences thanks to this change (as long as Congress does not void the 
commission’s decision, which is not expected).46  But they would not necessarily 
be released since they would not have any legal right to receive legal aid to seek 
sentence reductions under the new guidelines.
47
   
Modest sentencing reforms have faced considerable political opposition.  The 
Smarter Sentencing Act enacted by the Judiciary Committee was a greatly watered 
down version of the original legislation.  In a fruitless eleventh-hour effort to win 
wider Republican support, legislators inserted some new mandatory minimums for 
sexual abuse, domestic terrorism, and domestic violence, to the dismay of some 
penal reformers, including the National Task Force to End Sexual and Domestic 
Violence.
48
  In May 2014, dozens of former leaders in the Department of Justice 
[DOJ], the Drug Enforcement Agency [DEA], and U.S. Attorney’s Offices sent a 
letter to Senate leaders Harry Reid (D-NV) and Mitch McConnell (R-KY) urging 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
45  Jacob Sullum, Rand Paul: ‘I Am Here to Ask That We Begin the End of Mandatory 
Minimum Sentencing,’ FORBES (Sept. 18, 2013, 1:31 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/jacobsullum/2013/09/18/rand-paul-i-am-here-to-ask-that-we-begin-the-
end-of-mandatory-minimum-sentencing/. 
46  Jerry Markon & Rachel Weiner, Thousands of Felons Could Have Drug Sentences 
Lessened, WASH. POST (July 18, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/thousands-of-felons-
could-have-drug-sentences-lessened/2014/07/18/4876209e-0eb1-11e4-8341-b8072b1e7348_story.ht
ml.    
47  Most lower federal courts have held that federal inmates do not have a constitutional right 
to defense counsel to reduce their sentences.  Douglas A. Berman, How Many of the Nearly 50,000 
Federal Prisoners Need a Lawyer to Help with Drug Sentence Reduction Efforts? How Many Will 
Get a Lawyer?, SENT’G L. & POL’Y (July 21, 2014), http://sentencing.typepad.com 
/sentencing_law_and_policy/2014/07/how-many-of-the-nearly-50000-federal-prisoners-really-need-
a-lawyer-to-help-with-drug-sentence-reduc.html. 
48  Steven Nelson, New Mandatory Minimums Added to Bill Seeking to Reduce Stiff Drug 
Penalties, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (Jan. 30, 2014, 6:42 P.M.), 
http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2014/01/30/new-mandatory-minimums-added-to-bill-seeking-
to-reduce-stiff-drug-penalties. 
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them to defeat the Smarter Sentencing Act.
49
  Federal prosecutors openly revolted 
against Attorney General Eric Holder’s support of the Smarter Sentencing Act.  
In contrast, the National Association of Assistant United States Attorneys 
(NAAUSA), which represents the Department of Justice’s 5,300 federal 
prosecutors, mounted an aggressive public campaign in defense of mandatory 
minimums and called on other leading law enforcement groups to join them.  
NAAUSA also opposed the U.S. Sentencing Commission’s recent moves to reduce 
penalties for drug offenses.
50
  Maverick Senator Rand Paul has been promoting a 
much more ambitious package of criminal reform measures, but so far no 
Republican senator has endorsed his legislation.  Senator Cory Booker (D-NJ) is a 
co-sponsor of part of Paul’s reform package. 51  
 
III. YES YOU CAN 
 
Comprehensive sentencing reform by definition requires statutory changes.  
The political logjam in Washington and many state capitals is a convenient foil to 
excuse why so little progress has been made in slashing the country’s incarceration 
rate and ameliorating the collateral consequences of the carceral state.  It justifies 
the pursuit of small-bore solutions like the 3-Rs that are premised on splitting the 
difference without making any real difference in addressing the country’s 
enormous and growing political, social, and economic inequalities, of which the 
carceral state is the starkest example.  
Claims of legislative gridlock direct attention away from many non-legislative 
means available to begin razing the carceral state.  The carceral state was not built 
by punitive legislation alone.  It also required, particularly in its formative years, a 
shift in the sensibilities of government officials and law enforcement officers on 
the frontlines of the criminal justice system.  Police officers, parole and probation 
agents, judges, corrections officials, attorneys general, local district attorneys, and 
federal prosecutors began to exercise their discretion in a more punitive direction 
as they read the new cues coming from law-and-order politicians.  
                                                                                                                                                   
 
49  Letter from William P. Barr et al. to Senators Harry Reid and Mitch McConnell “Re: 
Federal Criminal Sentencing Reform” (May 12, 2014), available at 
http://www.crimeandconsequences.com/crimblog/2014/05/former-top-doj-leaders-oppose-.html. 
50  Letter from Robert Gay Guthrie, President, NAAUSA, to Senators Patrick Leahy and 
Charles Grassley “Re: Mandatory Minimum Legislation” (Jan. 31, 2014), available at 
http://www.naausa.org/2013/images/docs/MandMinSentencingLegOppose013114.pdf; Letter from 
Robert Gay Guthrie, President, NAAUSA, to Reynaldo Tariche, President, FBI Agents Ass’n, “Re: 
Save Federal Mandatory Minimum Sentences” (Jan. 2, 2014), available at 
http://www.naausa.org/2013/images/docs/Oppose-MandatoryMins.pdf; see also Markon & Weiner, 
supra note 46.   
51  Paul’s package includes ending mandatory minimums, expunging nonviolent felonies from 
criminal records, reclassifying some felonies as misdemeanors, eliminating the sentencing disparity 
between crack and powder cocaine, and restoring voting rights to people convicted of a nonviolent 
felony.  Ryan Lizza, The Revenge of Rand Paul, NEW YORKER, Oct. 6, 2014, at 44. 
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Many observers attribute U.S. punitiveness to the exceptional politicization of 
prosecutors and judges, who are elected or otherwise chosen in a partisan manner.  
However, this politicization can cut both ways.  Prosecutors and judges have 
tended to use their discretion over the past three to four decades to lean in a more 
punitive direction.  But that wide discretion also gives them great latitude to shift 
now and embrace alternatives to incarceration, as some district attorneys and 
judges have done.
52
 
The widely misunderstood implementation of the draconian Rockefeller drug 
laws in 1973 is a good case in point.
53
  At first, the Rockefeller laws had only a 
very modest impact on New York State’s incarceration rate.  This was due to the 
“selective pragmatic enforcement” by police, prosecutors, and judges, who initially 
viewed the new drug laws as wasteful and misguided.  That changed in the late 
1970s and early 1980s as Mayor Ed Koch of New York City and his new police 
commissioner embraced the “politics of disorder and fear” and sought to “retake 
the streets.”  Shortly thereafter, Democratic governor Hugh Carey promised major 
funding for new prison construction, and the state unveiled new joint state-local 
initiatives to target drug trafficking.  Thanks to these political shifts, prison 
commitments for drug violations began to soar in the early 1980s as police, 
prosecutors, and judges in New York State belatedly embraced the Rockefeller 
laws and became willing recruits in the war on drugs.  A decade later, some key 
law enforcement officials in New York State began to pull back from the war on 
drugs, and prison commitments for drug offenses began to fall.  This was many 
years before the Rockefeller drug laws were largely repealed in 2009.    
For all the talk about how mandatory minimums and mandatory guidelines 
built the carceral state, individuals serving on the frontlines of the criminal justice 
system retain considerable discretion to choose a less punitive path.  Rick 
Raemisch’s blistering 2014 New York Times op-ed about the night he spent in 
solitary confinement as executive director of the Colorado Department of 
Corrections is a rare and noteworthy example of a bold individual challenge to the 
ingrained, taken-for-granted punitive sensibilities of the carceral state written by 
someone who is part of the system.
54
  The President and state governors have 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
52  For example, Charles Hynes, the longtime district attorney of Kings County in Brooklyn, 
New York, pioneered programs that offer defendants drug treatment as an alternative to prison, 
expand services for victims of domestic violence, and help former inmates re-enter society.  His 
initiatives were a model for broader state-level reform in New York and nationally.  See Charles J. 
Hynes, ComALERT: A Prosecutor’s Collaborative Model for Ensuring a Successful Transition from 
Prison to the Community, 1 J. CT. INNOVATION 123 (2008).  
53  See David F. Weiman & Christopher Weiss, The Origins of Mass Incarceration in New 
York State: The Rockefeller Drug Laws and the Local War on Drugs, in DO PRISONS MAKE US 
SAFER? THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF THE PRISON BOOM 73, 73–89 (Steven Raphael & Michael A. 
Stoll eds., 2009). 
54  Rick Raemisch, My Night in Solitary, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2014, at A25, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/21/opinion/my-night-in-solitary.html; see also Aviva Stahl, New 
York City’s New Corrections Chief, Known for Solitary Confinement Reforms, Faces Steep Challenge 
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enormous discretion to grant executive clemency.  So far, they have been largely 
unwilling to wield these powers to start righting the wrongs of the carceral state.  
The presidents and state governors have failed to even make a statement declaring 
that the war on drugs and the war on crime are over.
55
  The Department of Justice 
could put an end to overcrowding in federal penitentiaries by calling a halt to the 
federal war on drugs.  After all, the federal government “generally has no 
fundamental ‘crime fighting’ obligation to prosecute drug offenses in its 
jurisdiction” since “virtually every state has a body of criminal law devoted to drug 
offenses—from infractions to major felonies.”56 
Federal judges retain broad sentencing discretion.  In more than seventy 
percent of federal cases, the statute does not impose a mandatory minimum.
57
  The 
2005 Booker and 2007 Gall decisions affirmed that federal judges have 
considerable leeway to depart from the mandatory sentencing guidelines.
58
  The 
2011 Pepper decision affirmed that the courts are permitted to draw on a wide 
range of information at sentencing, and that “the punishment should fit the 
offender and not merely the crime.”59  
 
IV. THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS 
 
All the attention on the tough federal sentencing guidelines and the 
overzealousness of presidents and members of Congress, to prosecute the war on 
drugs and the war on crime, has created the impression that the federal Bureau of 
Prisons [BOP] is largely a passive spectator in the carceral crisis.  For all of its 
law-and-order zeal in the 1980s and 1990s, Congress nonetheless endowed the 
BOP with considerable discretionary powers to pursue early release of federal 
inmates.  So far, the BOP has been generally unwilling to wield these powers.  
Without any changes in the federal sentencing guidelines or creation of new 
programs, the BOP could “eliminate thousands of years of unnecessary 
incarceration through full implementation of existing ameliorative statutes.”60  
                                                                                                                                                   
on Rikers Island, SOLITARY WATCH (Apr. 22, 2014), http://solitarywatch.com/2014/04/22/new-
corrections-chief-new-york-city-known-solitary-confinement-reforms-faces-steep-challenges-rikers-
island/.  
55  GOTTSCHALK, supra note 12, at 186–91. 
56  Mona Lynch, Theorizing the Role of the ‘War on Drugs’ in U.S. Punishment, 16 
THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 175, 180 (2012). 
57  Anne R. Traum, Mass Incarceration at Sentencing, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 423, 449 (2013).  
58  See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 
(2005). 
59  See Pepper v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1229, 1240 (2011) (internal citation omitted); 
Traum, supra note 57, at 448.  Traum persuasively argues that sentencing courts are permitted to 
consider—and should consider―relevant information about the harmful collateral consequences of 
mass incarceration not only for individual defendants but also for their families and communities 
when determining what punishment is suitable and fair. 
60  Stephen R. Sady & Lynn Deffebach,  Second Look Resentencing Under 18 U.S.C. § 
3582(c) as an Example of Bureau of Prisons Policies That Result in Over-Incarceration, 21 FED. 
SENT’G REP. 167, 167 (2009), available at http://or.fd.org/ReferenceFiles/ABACommission.pdf.  
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Instead, the BOP, which is under the authority of the DOJ, has continued to 
promulgate dire projections about the need for more prison beds as it has gone hat 
in hand to Congress year after year for more money to expand the federal prison 
system. 
The BOP and many state departments of corrections have important 
compassionate release policies and laws on the books that would permit them to 
release infirm and elderly inmates.  In 2013, the DOJ’s Inspector General issued a 
piercing report on the BOP’s mismanagement of compassionate release cases.  
Months later, the Justice Department indicated it would revamp its policies so that 
more federal inmates would qualify for timely compassionate release.
61
  
The BOP has mostly ignored the little known, but potentially powerful, 
“second look” provision of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.  This measure 
permits a sentencing judge to reduce a sentence if the court finds extraordinary and 
compelling circumstances.  Under the statute, the BOP plays a key gatekeeper 
function.  It is responsible for filing a motion to the court for reconsideration of a 
sentence.  The legislative history of this provision suggests that Congress sought to 
recognize a wide range of circumstances that would qualify for resentencing.  Over 
the years, the BOP has interpreted this statute very narrowly to apply only in cases 
of imminent death and has filed only a handful of resentencing motions.  In 
roughly a quarter of the cases, the federal inmate died before the court had ruled on 
the motion.
62
  In 2007, the U.S. Sentencing Commission adopted a new rule that 
set out no limit on what constitutes “extraordinary and compelling circumstances,” 
but little changed at the BOP.
63
  To the dismay of penal reform advocates and 
some members of Congress, the BOP has made scant use of several other 
important options at its disposal to reduce the time served for federal inmates.
64
 
 
V. THE “REAL LAWMAKERS” 
 
William Stuntz once characterized prosecutors as the “real lawmakers” of the 
criminal justice system because the penal code grants them such enormous leeway 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
61  Charlie Savage, More Releases of Ailing Prisoners Are Urged, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2013, at 
A17; Josh Gerstein, DOJ Pulls Bush-era Early Release Rules, POLITICO (Dec. 14, 2013, 12:25 PM), 
http://www.politico.com/blogs/under-the-radar/2013/12/doj-pulls-bushera-early-release-rules-
178834.html. 
62  With nearly 200,000 inmates in the federal system, the BOP approved on average less than 
two dozen motions each year between 2000 and 2008.  Sady & Deffebach, supra note 60.  
63  Id. 
64  These include underutilization of the Residential Drug Abuse Program (RDAP), enacted by 
Congress in 1994, and of community corrections options; and stingy and arguably incorrect formulas 
for calculating good time credits and computing release dates.  Id.; see also Letter from AdvoCare et 
al. to Senators Barbara Mikulski and Kay Bailey Hutchison (Apr. 17, 2012), available at, 
http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/inc_Senate_appropriations_%20ltr_FY2013.pdf; 
Brandon Sample & Derek Gilna, BOP’s RDAP Program Unevenly Administered and Unnecessarily 
Costly, PRISON LEGAL NEWS, Aug. 15, 2012, at 28. 
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in charging decisions.
65
  As the violent crime rate started falling in the early 1990s, 
changes in prosecutorial behavior were one of the most important contributors to 
the ongoing rise in the state prison population.  Much of the growth was not the 
result of judicial decisions to increase the use of prison sentences.  Rather, it was 
due to an increase in the number of violent offenses (and, to a lesser extent, 
property cases) brought forward successfully for prosecution and to an increase in 
the time served by violent offenders.
66
 
To reduce the imprisonment rate, prosecutors will have to be cajoled or 
pressured into embracing a commitment to sending fewer people to prison and to 
reducing sentence lengths.  In some cases, binding legislation may be necessary to 
force prosecutors to relinquish some of their discretionary powers.  Additionally, 
such legislation needs to make their activities and decisions more accountable and 
transparent to the public.  But, all paths to progressive penal reform do not have to 
run through state legislatures.  
Attorneys general and district attorneys have enormous authority to set “the 
tone and culture of the office” and to determine the direction in which prosecutors 
working under them exercise their discretion in individual cases.
67
  As a 
consequence, “the differences from one prosecutor’s office to the next—even 
operating in the same jurisdiction—can be stunning.”68  National trends obscure 
“the profound variations in incarceration rates across states, cities, and especially 
local communities within cities.”69  
U.S. prosecutors are arguably the most powerful officials in the U.S. criminal 
justice system and the least understood and least transparent.
70
  Historically, U.S. 
prosecutors have had enormous power relative to prosecutors in other 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
65  William Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 506 
(2001); see also Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure, 81 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 911, 932–33 (2006). 
66  William Sabol, Implications of Criminal Justice System Adaptation for Prison Population 
Growth and Corrections Policy, Paper presented at Symposium on Crime and Justice: The Past and 
Future of Empirical Sentencing Research  20 (2010), 
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67  ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR 97 
(2007).  
68  Shawn D. Bushway & Brian Forst, Discretion, Rule of Law, and Rationality, Paper 
presented at Symposium on Crime and Justice: The Past and Future of Empirical Sentencing 
Research 17 (2010) http://www.albany.edu/scj/documents/Forst-Bushway_Discretion_000.pdf.  For 
recommendations on how to improve prosecutorial accountability, see DAVIS, supra note 67, at ch. 
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SENT’G REP. 334, 334–36 (2008).  
69  Robert J. Sampson & Charles Loeffler, Punishment’s Place: The Local Concentration of 
Mass Incarceration 139 DÆDALUS 20, 20 (2010). 
70  See DAVIS, supra note 67, at 5; Brian Forst, Prosecution, in CRIME & PUBLIC POLICY 437 
(James Q. Wilson & Joan Petersilia eds., 2011).  
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industrialized democracies.
71
  As states and the federal government revamped their 
sentencing structures in the 1980s and 1990s to curtail the discretion of judges 
(and, in some cases, the police), even more discretionary and other powers flowed 
to prosecutors.  With the proliferation of mandatory minimum sentences and other 
get-tough policies, and the contraction of legal resources for public defenders, the 
already-enormous charging and plea-bargaining powers of U.S. prosecutors 
expanded even further.
72
  Several landmark court cases challenging prosecutors’ 
wide prerogatives were decided in their favor and further enhanced their powers.
73
  
Prosecutors not only got tougher but also created powerful local, state, and 
national organizations to represent their interests and coordinate their political 
activities.
74
  Furthermore, they forged close alliances with other law enforcement 
groups and helped create a conservative victim’s rights movement premised on a 
zero-sum vision of justice that pitted victims against offenders.
75
  Recently, 
statewide associations of district attorneys allied closely with other law 
enforcement organizations and with victims’ rights organizations have been 
leading opponents of sentencing and other penal reforms aimed at reducing the 
incarcerated population.
76
   
So far, U.S. prosecutors “have escaped the kind of scrutiny and accountability 
that we demand of public officials in a democratic society.”77  While police forces 
have become substantially more transparent and publicly accountable over the past 
several decades, prosecutors’ offices are actually far less transparent today than 
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H. Kadish, ed., 1983); GOTTSCHALK, supra note 40, at 91–98. 
72  In late 2013, Human Rights Watch released a scorching report on how federal prosecutors 
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at 127–29. 
74  For example, the Texas District and County Attorneys Association was a critical player in 
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Enforcement: An Examination of the Emergence of "Law and Order" Politics in Texas, 45 LAW & 
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75  See GOTTSCHALK, supra note 40, at chs. 4–6. 
76  See, e.g., Associated Press, Alabama DAs, Victims Group Oppose New Sentencing 
Guidelines, WKRG.COM (Aug. 10, 2013, 12:55 P.M.) http://www.wkrg.com/story/23100067/das-
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decades ago.
78
  Most of their decisions are “totally discretionary and virtually 
unreviewable.”79  
By changing their behavior, prosecutors could have a profound impact on 
lowering incarceration rates and reducing racial disparities in sentences even 
without any statutory changes.  For example, district attorneys could shift the 
standard for charging from “Probable Cause” to “likelihood of conviction.”  Or 
they could make a policy decision not to prosecute certain low-level offenders, as 
the Milwaukee district attorney did in the case of first-time offenders caught with 
drug paraphernalia.
80
  
New research suggests that federal prosecutors, not federal judges, are the 
most persistent source of racial disparities in sentencing.  Sonja Starr and Marit 
Rehavi found that, all things being equal, federal prosecutors were nearly twice as 
likely to charge African-American men with an offense carrying a mandatory 
minimum sentence as white men.
81
  With the help of a promising Vera Institute 
program, prosecutors in Milwaukee and in Mecklenburg, North Carolina, were 
able to reduce unwarranted racial disparities in their criminal justice systems by 
altering their seemingly race-neutral charging and plea-bargaining decisions.
82
  
Cyrus Vance, Jr., the Manhattan district attorney, permitted the Vera Institute to 
conduct a comprehensive two-year study of his office in order to identify the 
sources of persistent racial disparities in processing criminal cases and to devise 
remedies for unwarranted racial disparities.
83
   
What incentives do prosecutors have to behave less punitively now?  As 
prisons and jails eat up more state, municipal, and county budgets, prosecutors face 
the prospect of shrinking revenues to run their offices.  But, more importantly, 
politics is all about forcing incentives to change.  So far, district attorneys and 
other prosecutors have faced little political pressure to change.  A 2014 report by 
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http://www.vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/race-and-prosecution-manhattan-
summary.pdf. 
2015] BRING IT ON  577 
 
 
the Brennan Center for Justice, which Attorney General Eric Holder warmly 
praised, called for changing the incentives for prosecutors by, among other things, 
basing their budgets on how well they meet the twin goals of reducing crime and 
reducing mass incarceration.
84
   
When he was president of the National Association for the Advancement of 
Colored People (NAACP), Benjamin Jealous designated mass incarceration as the 
leading civil rights challenge of this generation.
85
  If that is so, then getting deeply 
involved in electoral contests for local district attorneys, and otherwise putting 
political pressure on them, should be a top priority for civil rights and other groups 
committed to dismantling the carceral state.  If the aim is to shift penal policy in a 
less punitive direction, these local electoral contests are arguably as important—or 
even more important—than mobilizing for the quadrennial presidential elections.  
Maverick district attorneys, who were launched into office in major urban 
areas with the backing of broad penal reform coalitions, have served as important 
beachheads to engineer wider statewide shifts in penal policy.  The upset victory of 
David Soales in Albany’s 2004 race for district attorney was a “watershed event” 
in the fight to reform the strict drug laws of the Rockefeller era in New York 
State.
86
  His electoral victory, coming on the heels of the decade-old “Drop the 
Rock” campaign, paved the way for the beginning of the end of the Rockefeller 
drug laws.  
George Gascón, San Francisco’s District Attorney and a former police chief, 
was a major sponsor of Proposition 47, a modest but important penal reform ballot 
initiative that nearly 60 percent of California voters backed in the November 2014 
election.  He joined the former police chief of San Diego to work on behalf of this 
measure, which converts several lower-level, nonviolent felonies into 
misdemeanors and subject them to reduced sanctions.  The changes would apply 
retroactively, lightening the penalties for thousands of people incarcerated in 
California.
87
  Most other district attorneys and many police chiefs in California 
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vehemently opposed this 2014 ballot measure to reduce the penalties for low-level 
theft and drug crimes.
88
   
The focus cannot be solely on electoral politics, however.  Reform groups 
need to exert ongoing pressure on district attorneys to make their actions more 
transparent and publicly accountable.  For example, a reform coalition launched 
Seth Williams, Philadelphia’s first African-American district attorney, into office 
to succeed longtime district attorney Lynne Abraham.  A self-proclaimed “tough 
cookie,” Abraham had garnered a national reputation as “the deadliest D.A.” for 
her aggressive use of capital punishment.
89
  But since taking office in 2010, 
Williams has faced remarkably little political pushback as he has moved in a law-
and-order direction.
90
  
Five years into his tenure, Attorney General Eric Holder finally appeared 
ready to assert some of his vast discretion to challenge the carceral state.  He 
created front-page news in August 2013 when he announced at the annual meeting 
of the American Bar Association that he had ordered federal prosecutors to omit 
specifying the quantities of illegal drugs in indictments for certain low-level drug 
offenders.  By making this shift, prosecutors would avoid triggering the strict 
federal mandatory minimum penalties based on drug quantities.  Although this 
announcement created a stir, its practical consequences might turn out to be quite 
minimal.  The pool of federal defendants who would qualify for the new policies 
was drawn quite narrowly.
91
  Furthermore, federal prosecutors retain enormous 
leeway on how to charge these cases.
92
  A potentially more consequential change, 
which received less attention, was Holder’s announcement that the Justice 
Department was instituting new policies designed to leave more crimes for local 
and state courts and prosecutors to dispose of, rather than have the federal 
government step in.  Furthermore, Holder used his ABA speech as an opportunity 
to launch a broader rhetorical assault on mass incarceration and the racial 
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disparities that run through the criminal justice system.  He conceded that the 
system “is in too many respects broken.”93    
In short, comprehensive sentencing reform will not be enough on its own to 
reverse the prison boom because the criminal justice system is highly adaptive.  To 
make major and lasting cuts, the penal sensibilities and penal culture of all 
components of the criminal justice system—police, prosecutors, judges, 
corrections administrators, parole and probation officers—will have to change.  
They need to buy into the goal of major reductions in the prison and jail population 
and to coordinate their behavior to achieve that end.  Without that coordination, 
attempts to reduce the incarcerated population will remain a complex and often 
futile game of Whack-a-Mole.  Single-minded attention on "reforming" any one or 
two pieces of the criminal justice system to reduce the number of people in jail and 
prison will not necessarily have the desired result because the system is highly 
adaptive.  
Prosecutors remain the preeminent players in this game.  By changing their 
actions and sensibilities, individual district attorneys, especially in large urban 
areas, have the potential to be important catalysts.  They can help to facilitate the 
system-wide coordination and change in penal culture that is so critical to slashing 
the number of people in U.S. jails and prisons.  But so far, these district attorneys 
have faced little political pressure to behave otherwise even though many of their 
constituents have been disproportionately harmed by the carceral state.   
 
VI. REALIGNMENT AND POLITICAL PUSHBACK IN CALIFORNIA 
 
Recent developments in California are a bracing reminder of how the path 
toward decarceration remains steep and politically tortuous.  In the acrimonious 
May 2011 Brown v. Plata decision, a sharply divided Supreme Court ruled 5 to 4 
that the overcrowded conditions in California prisons were unconstitutional.
94
  
Specifically, the justices held that inadequate medical and mental health care was 
responsible for one inmate dying each week due to neglect.  The Court ruled that 
the state needed to reduce the prison population to 137.5 percent of design capacity 
within two years.  Anticipating the Court's decision, Governor Jerry Brown signed 
the Public Safety Realignment Act into law weeks earlier.  Law enforcement 
officials, the correctional officers’ union, and key legislators negotiated that 
measure behind the scenes with the Brown administration without any input from 
the wider public or incarcerated men, women, and their advocates.
95
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Realignment in California seeks to divert many of the non, non, nons from 
state prisons and the state parole system to county jails and locally supervised 
community sanctions (such as probation and mandated substance abuse treatment).  
It bestows block grants on counties to implement realignment with virtually no 
strings attached, little state oversight, and no evaluations.  While counties have 
used some of the new state money to develop innovative alternatives to 
incarceration, many counties have responded by investing heavily in jail expansion 
and by bolstering law enforcement budgets.  They have eschewed using the 
billions of new state dollars allocated for realignment to invest in mental health 
and substance abuse treatment and other social services for offenders diverted out 
of the state prison system.
96
  This is not so surprising, since the legislation 
mandated the creation of Community Corrections Partnerships to be composed 
primarily of law enforcement officials.
97
   
California appears on its way to substantiating Heather Schoenfeld’s claim 
about the paradox of prison conditions litigation: if you litigate it, they very well 
may build it.
98
  As of July 2012, the state had approved applications from 21 
counties to build over 10,000 new jail beds at a cost of $1.2 billion.  The state had 
plans for an additional $500 million in jail construction programs.  If all this 
construction is carried out, the total number of jail beds will increase by over 
17,000—a far cry from any decarceration.  As one observer noted, “Prison 
building, essentially, has gone local.”99  
Although the state prison population fell substantially in the years 
immediately after realignment was first implemented, California’s jail population 
continued to rise.  About one-third of the inmates that were realigned from 
California’s prisons ended up in county jails.100  Parolees with technical violations 
were returned to jail, not prison, and certain non, non, nons were diverted to local 
jails.  The large decline in California’s state prison population is responsible for a 
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large portion of the recent nationwide drop in the nation’s total state prison 
population, as discussed earlier.
101
   
County jails have a well-deserved reputation as the “worst blight in American 
corrections.”102  Many jails in California were already seriously overcrowded 
before realignment came along.
103
  Designed and intended to house short-term, 
transient populations, jails do not have the medical facilities, programs, and 
security resources to meet the needs of inmates serving sentences counted in years, 
not months or weeks.
104
  Security and other problems in California jails are 
mounting as long-term, high-security inmates are serving their time alongside the 
run-of-the-mill, low-level defendants who predominate in county jails.
105
  The 
Prison Law Office has already filed class action lawsuits in Fresno and Riverside 
counties, charging violations of inmates’ Eight Amendment protections.106  Civil 
rights lawyers and prisoner rights advocates do not have the resources to monitor 
effectively the conditions in the more than 150 jails scattered throughout 
California’s 58 counties, let alone sue them all.  
In 2013, the number of state prison inmates increased by one percent in 
California, the first uptick since the state prison population peaked in 2007.
107
  Late 
that year, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation projected 
that the state prison population would grow by more than 10,000 inmates over the 
next five years.  State officials announced plans to house thousands of inmates in 
private out-of-state facilities, increase the capacity of the California prison system, 
and institute new parole programs to meet the expected demand for more prison 
beds.  As of early 2014, about 9,000 California inmates were already serving their 
sentences in private prisons run by the Corrections Corporation of America (CCA) 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
101 GLAZE & HERBERMAN, supra note 1, at 1. 
102 Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555, 1686 n.434 (2003).  Jails 
tend to be more chaotic and dangerous places than prisons due to more transient populations, 
inadequate resources to separate prisoners by security risk, fewer programs, and more inmate 
idleness.  Id. at 1686. 
103 As of 2014, 37 of California’s 58 county jail systems were operating under self-imposed or 
court-ordered population caps.  See Petersilia, supra note 96, at 350.  
104 In some Los Angeles jails, inmates only get three hours per week outside of their cells—
even less than inmates confined to supermax facilities.  See Paige St. John, Long-term Inmates—and 
Prison Culture—Move Into County Jails, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2013), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/sep/08/local/la-me-ff-long-haul-inmates-20130909.  As of September 
2013, county jails in California housed nearly 1,300 inmates sentenced to five years or more.  Id. 
105 The California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation reports that inmate-on-inmate 
and inmate-on-staff assaults in state prisons have declined dramatically as realignment has eased 
overcrowding in state prisons.  But local sheriffs report a disturbing rise in inmate-on-inmate assaults 
in local jails as more would-be state prisoners are realigned to overcrowded local jails with 
inadequate rehabilitation and other programs.  Petersilia, supra note 96, at 349. 
106 Id. at 350. 
107 See E. ANN CARSON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 
2013 4 (Sept. 2014), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p13.pdf; MAC TAYLOR, 
LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, STATE OF CALIFORNIA, CAL FACTS: 2013 53–55 (Jan. 2, 2013), 
available at http://www.lao.ca.gov/reports/2013/calfacts/calfacts_010213.pdf. 
582 OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW [Vol 12:559 
 
 
far from home in Arizona, Mississippi, and Oklahoma.
108
  Even with the thousands 
of additional beds planned, California is expected to increasingly exceed the 
population cap that was affirmed by the Supreme Court.  By 2017, the total jail and 
prison population might actually be 5,100 higher than it was at the time of the 
Brown v. Plata decision in 2011, according to some calculations.
109
  
Governor Brown has a mixed record on sentencing and other reforms to 
reduce the state’s incarcerated population.  In October 2013, he vetoed a bill that 
would have permitted prosecutors or judges to charge simple drug possession as a 
misdemeanor instead of a felony, to the surprise and disappointment of the bill’s 
sponsors.  A year later, he signed a measure that ensures that people found guilty 
of certain crack cocaine offenses will no longer receive stiffer sanctions than 
people convicted of comparable powder cocaine violations.
110
  Brown did not take 
a position on Proposition 47, the 2014 ballot measure to reduce sanctions for 
lower-level, nonviolent offenses.
111
  However, unlike his predecessors in 
California and governors in other states, Brown has been much more willing to 
parole people serving life sentences.  Since 2009, over 1,700 lifers have been 
released in California, which is more than twice the total number of lifers paroled 
in the Golden States in the previous two decades.
112
 
Realignment was drafted with the interests of law enforcement officials 
uppermost in mind.  But many of them, especially prosecutors, remain 
disillusioned and opposed to key elements of the legislation.
113
  Only a single 
Republican voted for the realignment bill.  Opponents have sought to make 
realignment a major electoral issue and have blamed some recent blips in 
California’s crime rates on realignment.  It is hard to rebut these claims.  Even 
though realignment is the “biggest penal experiment in modern history,” the state 
provided no funding to evaluate its effects on public safety, the criminal justice 
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system, and the size of the incarcerated population.
114
  It also did not include any 
money for public information programs to educate citizens about the aims, 
rationale, and progress of realignment.
115
  
For all the talk about a new bipartisan era that leans toward less punishment 
not more, the ghosts of the law-and-order era have not been vanquished.  Abel 
Maldonado, a gubernatorial hopeful, backed a brash campaign in May 2013 to 
repeal realignment.  Republican legislative leaders launched a media campaign 
accusing Maldonado and other Democrats of undermining bipartisan legislation 
enacted in 2007 that called for building more prisons and local jails to alleviate 
overcrowding.
116
  The state’s correctional officers’ union has moderated its 
virulently anti-prisoner and pro-prison growth rhetoric and staked out some 
apparently progressive positions on penal reform, but many of its actions “indicate 
continued opposition to serious change.”117  In early 2014, three former governors, 
including Democrat Gray Davis, announced they would be spearheading a new 
ballot initiative to foreshorten the appeals process for people on death row so as to 
expedite executions.  The measure also calls for returning death row inmates to the 
general inmate population, where it would be less expensive to house them as they 
get conveyed along a faster track to their lethal injection.
118
  
 
VII. THE POLITICS OF DISMANTLING THE CARCERAL STATE 
 
Developments in penal policy and practice are rarely the result of a single 
factor but rather of a wide variety of forces that interact with one another.  These 
forces reflect and reproduce key features of a country’s specific history, culture, 
polity, and institutions.  This reality makes the political task of dismantling the 
carceral state all the more daunting.  
Employing a wider historical and political lens to analyze the problem of the 
carceral state and the political possibilities for dismantling it is highly revealing.  It 
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is a striking reminder that some of the most successful penal reform movements in 
the United States over the last century and a half raised penetrating questions about 
economic and social justice.  These movements did not act in isolation but were 
buoyed by contemporaneous political and social movements.  The push to abolish 
the convict-leasing system that gripped the South for more than half a century 
drew some of its lifeblood from the Populist, Progressive, and feminist movements 
of the late 19th and early 20th centuries.
119
  A century ago, the exploitation of 
penal labor in Northern prison factories run by private entrepreneurs was central to 
wider political debates as the nation grappled with the wrenching economic and 
political upheavals brought on by industrialization and urbanization.  How inmates 
were treated in these prison factories came to be seen as a crucial barometer of 
economic and social justice in the wider society.
120
  In the 1960s and 1970s, the 
prisoners’ rights and the Civil Rights Movement were deeply entangled with one 
another and drew important support from other political and social movements, 
including the labor movement.
121
  
The most relevant historical example may be the movement to 
deinstitutionalize the mentally ill in the second half of the 20
th
 century.  
Deinstitutionalization was a rare instance in which states chose to shutter a vast 
archipelago of public institutions that they had invested heavily in for many years.  
That shutdown involved a protracted political drama that played out for decades 
and that did not have an entirely happy ending.
122
  
Rising anxiety among state officials about the escalating costs of state mental 
institutions in the late 1940s did not on its own empty state asylums.  Leadership at 
the federal level was critical to spurring deinstitutionalization.  Another vital factor 
was the shift in the training, worldview, and identity of the psychiatric profession 
as the American Psychiatric Association split over the question of institutional care 
versus the community mental health model.  The emergence of major new and 
inter-connected social movements (including the civil rights movement and the 
senior citizens movement) also was pivotal in pushing policy makers to embrace 
deinstitutionalization of the mentally ill.  So was the growing journalistic and 
popular attention to the dire conditions in state mental hospitals.  The final critical 
factor was the reconception of the mental health issue to include not just 
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individuals and their individual diseases but also mental health as a barometer for 
the health of the whole community.
123
 
Mental institutions were a huge and growing drain on state budgets for years, 
yet deinstitutionalization progressed very slowly.  It was not until the 1990s—three 
decades after deinstitutionalization started—that whole institutions began to close 
in significant numbers.  It took just as long for political leaders and the public to 
acknowledge that successful integration requires more than adequate medical 
treatment, and that the mentally ill needed access to good housing and jobs as 
well.
124
   Deinstitutionalization was not an unqualified victory.  With the closing of 
state mental hospitals and the contraction of federal money for treatment, services, 
and housing, jails and prisons unfortunately became the mental institutions of last 
resort for many seriously ill people.  Cutbacks in mental health funds together with 
cuts in federal money for public housing and other services led to streams of 
apparently deranged people living on the streets.  This outcome fueled a backlash 
against deinstitutionalization and community mental health.  It overshadowed the 
fact that many mentally ill people made successful transitions to community life.
125
 
 
VIII. THE INVISIBILITY OF THE CARCERAL STATE 
 
Although important parallels exist, there are some key differences between 
the deinstitutionalization case and the problem of the carceral state.  Engineering 
major cuts to the country’s incarcerated population is likely to be an even greater 
political challenge than deinstitutionalizing the mentally ill.  One key difference is 
that the problems of state asylums were far more visible to the wider public.    
Prisons were not always the foreign, invisible worlds that they are today for 
most Americans.  Here I mean real prisons, not the prisons imagined by 
Hollywood and prime-time television.  The prisons of popular culture have created 
a “troubling distance between the punisher and punished,” as Michelle Brown 
explains.  They foster spectacle but not a “critical self-awareness of the role of law 
and institutions in the production of pain and violence.”126  
                                                                                                                                                   
 
123 See GERALD N. GROB, THE MAD AMONG US: A HISTORY OF THE CARE OF AMERICA’S 
MENTALLY ILL ch. 8 (1994); DAVID J. ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM: SOCIAL ORDER 
AND DISORDER IN THE NEW REPUBLIC chs. 10–11 (Little, Brown, and Co., 1990); STEVEN M. GILLON, 
“THAT’S NOT WHAT WE MEANT TO DO”: REFORM AND ITS UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES IN 
TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA ch. 2 (2000); E. FULLER TORREY, OUT OF THE SHADOWS: 
CONFRONTING AMERICA’S MENTAL ILLNESS CRISIS chs. 6, 9 (1997). 
124 CHRIS KOYANAGI, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, LEARNING FROM 
HISTORY: DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION OF PEOPLE WITH MENTAL ILLNESS AS PRECURSOR TO LONG-
TERM CARE REFORM 7–9 (2007), available at 
http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/7684.pdf. 
125 See GROB, supra note 123, at 308–09. 
126 Michelle Brown, Penal Spectatorship and the Culture of Punishment, in WHY PRISON? 108, 
108, 122–23 (David Scott ed., 2013). 
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Once upon a time, famous prisons like Sing Sing hosted thousands of visitors 
each year, including average citizens as well as celebrities like Babe Ruth and the 
Populist firebrand William Jennings Bryan.  Inmates themselves also once played 
pivotal roles in making the prison a leading public issue.  The escapes, strikes, 
mutinies, and riots of leased convicts, and their angry and mournful letters and 
memoirs helped bring about the end of the brutal practice of convict leasing and to 
eventually improve conditions on state-run penal farms.
127
  The strikes and protests 
of inmates in Northern prison factories in the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 centuries were 
catalysts for the enactment of state and federal legislation restricting the use of 
penal labor.
128
  The growing number of self-mutilations by convicts on state-run 
penal farms in the 1940s eventually made it impossible for state officials and 
enterprising journalists to ignore the abhorrent conditions that provoked these 
bloody and desperate acts of protest.
129
 
Protests and riots no longer pose the political problems they once did for state 
officials and prison administrators.  This is due partly to the development of tear 
gas and other anti-riot equipment beginning in the 1930s and of new management 
techniques (most notably the extensive use of super-maximum [supermax] prisons 
and cells that so severely isolate and punish inmates).
130
  Today the barriers to 
mobilizing and protesting from within are extraordinarily high.  As such, the 
massive 2010 strike by Georgia inmates protesting prison conditions and the huge 
2011-13 hunger strikes waged against supermax facilities in California are all the 
more remarkable. 
Decades ago, the popular press and a vibrant prison press extensively covered 
penal issues and served as important prods to reform.  Due to cutbacks and 
restructuring in the news business over the past three decades, investigative pieces 
documenting abuses in all kinds of institutions, including prisons, nursing homes, 
and hospitals, are rarer today.  That may change with the recent founding of the 
Marshall Project.  This is a new nonprofit news venture dedicated to covering the 
criminal justice system in the United States that Bill Keller, the former executive 
editor of The New York Times, has helped launch.
131
 
Another challenge is that corrections administrators and other state officials 
have been erecting ever-higher barriers for journalists attempting to cover what 
happens behind prison walls, including complete bans on face-to-face interviews 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
127 See generally PERKINSON, supra note 119; OSHINSKY, supra note 119.  
128 See MCLENNAN, supra note 120, at ch. 4. 
129 Convicts would cut off a limb or pack a self-inflicted wound with lye or inject themselves 
with kerosene to get some relief from backbreaking field labor and to protest their horrid living and 
working conditions.  After 21 prisoners maimed themselves in 1935 at one penal farm in Texas by 
chopping off their lower legs, the top administrator told the guards, “As long as they want to . . . chop 
themselves . . . I say give them more axes.”  PERKINSON, supra note 119, at 214. 
130 See generally Alan Eladio Gómez, Resisting Living Death at Marion Federal Penitentiary, 
1972, 96 RADICAL HIST. REV. 58 (2006); see also MCLENNAN, supra note 120, at ch. 10. 
131 Bill Keller, A Letter from our Editor, THE MARSHALL PROJECT (Nov. 15, 2014), 
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with inmates in some states.
132
  The once vibrant in-house penal press is nearly 
extinct, thanks to a series of unfavorable court decisions since the mid-1970s.  
These decisions have whittled away First Amendment rights for prison journalists 
and have granted penal authorities enormous latitude to censor what publications 
inmates are allowed to read.
133
  (An inmate in the federal supermax prison in 
Florence, Colorado, even had to go to court to fight for the right to read Barack 
Obama’s two best-selling books.  Prison authorities had deemed that the 
president’s books were “potentially detrimental to national security.”) 134 
Compared to prisoners today, the mentally ill and their legal advocates had 
considerable access to the courts in the 1960s and 1970s to press their civil rights 
claims and expose the dire conditions in state mental hospitals.  Thanks to the 
Prison Litigation Reform Act, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 
and a string of unfavorable court decisions, prisoners and their legal advocates 
have had greater difficulty using the courts to pursue civil rights claims and to 
document and expose the conditions in U.S. jails and prisons.
135
  The milestone 
Brown v. Plata decision may be the exception that proves the rule.  It took more 
than 15 years for this case to reach the Supreme Court.  After the Court rendered 
its decision, California officials continued to wage a legal war of attrition to 
undermine it.    
One cannot help but wonder whether the wider public turned its gaze away 
from prisons not just because corrections officials developed more sophisticated 
technologies and legal weapons to quell prison protests and render life behind the 
walls invisible.  One of the big stories from the 1930s onward is how the country’s 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
132 With the strong support of the state’s correctional officers’ union, Governor Pete Wilson of 
California pushed through trendsetting legislation in 1995 to ban all journalists from interviewing any 
prisoners.  Geri Lynn Green, The Quixotic Dilemma: California’s Immutable Culture of 
Incarceration, 30 PACE L. REV. 1453, 1470 (2010); see also Jessica Pupovac, The Battle to Open 
Prisons to Journalists, CRIME REP. (Jan. 2, 2013, 7:34 AM), 
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179–86 (Transaction Publishers, 2002) (1998); Leah Caldwell, The Decline and Fall of the Prison 
Press, PRISON LEGAL NEWS, June 15, 2006, at 20, available at 
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134 Ed Pilkington, Supermax Prison Blocked Obama Books Requested by Detainee, GUARDIAN 
(July 10, 2009, 1:07 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/jul/10/barack-obama-books-
blocked-prison.  Contrary to claims made in court papers, a BOP spokesperson contends the bureau 
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Access to Obama’s Books, NBCNEWS.COM (July 10, 2009, 5:40 PM), 
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books/#.UAQvNa6ttFo. 
135 See generally Margo Schlanger & Giovanna Shay, Preserving the Rule of Law in 
America’s Jails and Prisons: The Case for Amending the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 11 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 139 (2008); HUM. RTS. WATCH, NO EQUAL JUSTICE: THE PRISON LITIGATION REFORM ACT 
IN THE UNITED STATES (2009), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us0609web.pdf. 
588 OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW [Vol 12:559 
 
 
prison population went from being predominantly white to being predominantly 
black and brown.  This likely helps explain why the general public no longer 
identified with people on the inside, especially once law-and-order politicians 
decided to turn black into a synonym for violence and crime.  Young minority men 
were a far less sympathetic population than the troubled young white women and 
elderly patients with dementia who filled state asylums years ago.
136
 
The slave narratives of the antebellum period, which graphically rendered the 
physical pain that slaves suffered and made it widely visible, helped to propel the 
abolitionist cause.
137
  Today, what happens in prison stays mostly in prison, 
making it harder to draw connections in the public mind between justice on the 
inside and justice on the outside.  The ability to identify with an offender—or 
not—is a key predictor of why people differ in their levels of punitiveness.138  The 
invisibility of the millions of people behind bars has made it extremely difficult to 
alter the negative portrait that members of the general public have of people who 
have been convicted of a crime.  They are simply prisoners and criminals.  As 
such, they often are denied their humanity and denied any right to democratic 
accountability, much as slaves were in the United States.  
 
IX. PUBLIC OPINION AND PENAL REFORM 
 
Although public opinion probably poses a greater hurdle to penal reform than 
it did to mental health reform, it is easy to overestimate how high this hurdle is.  
Politicians and policy makers seriously misperceive public opinion on penal 
matters, mistakenly seeing the public as inherently punitive.  Legislators remain 
deeply reluctant to shift public policy toward greater leniency, even in the face of 
evidence that public opinion on crime and punishment can be quite malleable and 
that support for hard-line policies has been falling.  National surveys suggest 
considerable decreases since the early-to-mid 1990s in key indicators of public 
punitiveness, including public fear of crime, that the courts are too lenient, support 
for the death penalty, and designation of crime as a top priority.
139
 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
136 Between 1950 and 1980, 80 to nearly 90 percent of the patients in state asylums were white 
and nearly half of them were women.  Steven Raphael and Michael A. Stoll conclude that 
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Public opinion looks more intractable and punitive than it is, partly due to the 
shortcomings of survey research in this area.
140
  Qualitative gauges of public 
opinion (such as focus groups) and surveys that permit respondents to rank their 
policy preferences indicate that Americans have much more nuanced views of 
spending on criminal justice than the popular media or public policy debates 
suggest.
141
  
Public opinion about crime and punishment is highly racialized, with 
considerable gaps between whites and blacks on key issues.  Whites tend to 
associate crime and violence with being African-American and are more likely 
than blacks to support harsh penal policies.
142
  This racialization of public opinion 
on crime and punishment should not be viewed as an implacable obstacle to 
dismantling the carceral state.  Yes, public opinion on crime and punishment is 
highly racialized today.  But when in U.S. history has it not been?  Furthermore, 
whites and blacks do not have monolithic views on criminal justice matters.  
Views vary considerably among whites and among blacks.  Simplistic polls that 
ask whether one favors more or less punitive policies do not capture this 
complexity of views.
143
  
 
X. POLITICAL QUIESCENCE AND RESISTANCE 
 
Debates about crime, punishment, and law-and-order have been deeply 
entangled in wider political battles and electoral strategies in ways that the mental 
health issue never was.  Republicans waged the rebirth of the modern Republican 
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142 NAZGOL GHANDNOOSH, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, RACE AND PUNISHMENT: RACIAL 
PERCEPTIONS OF CRIME AND SUPPORT FOR PUNITIVE POLICIES 3–4 (2014), available at 
http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/rd_Race_and_Punishment.pdf. 
143 For a review of these research findings, see GOTTSCHALK, supra note 12, at 154–56. 
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Party on the Southern strategy, which invoked law-and-order appeals to stoke 
racial anxieties and animosities.  Democrat Bill Clinton staked his campaign for 
the White House on a kinder, gentler version of the Southern strategy to woo the 
so-called Reagan Democrats back to the party.  Given that the crime and 
punishment issue has been a pillar for repositioning the major political parties, 
political openings to shift penal policy in a less punitive direction are fraught with 
risk and are hard to sustain.  The opportunity for the emergence of the penal 
equivalent of a Robert Felix to put into motion a federal plan to spur a major 
decarceration of state prisons is less likely.
144
  
The Southern strategy, the racialization of public opinion on crime and 
punishment, and the entrenched history of racial intransigence in the United States 
cannot on their own explain why the carceral state has not faced more opposition 
from the groups most harmed by it.  As discussed throughout this article, the 
carceral state cannot be understood separately from the wider political, economic, 
and social context in which it was constructed.  The rise of the carceral state 
coincided with what Michael Dawson has characterized as a “dangerous decline” 
in the black public sphere and black civil society since the 1970s.
145
  A variety of 
factors are to blame: internal dissension, state repression, the ascendancy of 
neoliberalism, growing income and other inequalities between blacks, and the 
emergence of African-American neighborhoods of extreme and concentrated 
poverty and crime.
146
  Residents of these poor neighborhoods are much more likely 
to view the problems in their communities as insolvable and to mistrust groups that 
have been key coalition partners in previous political movements, including 
unions, the working class, and the middle class.
147
  These developments help 
explain their relative political quiescence in the face of the enormous injustices of 
the carceral state.  
Moreover, major national organizations committed to social and economic 
justice are vexed with subtle biases that keep them from mobilizing on behalf of 
the most marginalized groups in the United States, including offenders and ex-
offenders.
148
  These organizations have failed to embrace “affirmative advocacy” 
to ensure that the plight of the most disadvantaged groups are more central to their 
mission.
149
  This would include changing how decisions are made and ensuring 
greater representation for members of these groups on their staffs and boards.  It 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
144 As director of the Division of Mental Health of the U.S. Public Health Service in the 1940s, 
Robert Felix shrewdly maneuvered to end federal passivity on mental health.  He was an 
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also would entail developing stronger ties to local and state advocacy groups so 
that these groups serve as “democratic checks” on national organizations and as 
vehicles for more progressive ideas to “trickle up.”150  
These national organizations will not lead the way out of the carceral state 
without pressure from a more radical flank.  Without that, they are unlikely to 
develop a penal reform vision that extends much beyond the 3R’s and the Right on 
Crime coalition.  As Dawson notes, the three most successful periods of black 
political mobilization—Reconstruction, the Progressive era, and the combined civil 
rights and Black Power era—“were all marked by innovative initiatives within 
black civil society, a growing and robust black public sphere,” and an active 
radical flank.
151
  These movements did not single-mindedly focus on the problem 
of racial disparities and inequities but sought to forge a broader political agenda 
centered on racial, social, and economic justice.  
All the focus on the 3-Rs and the Right on Crime coalition has overshadowed 
the growing political ferment at the grass-roots level against the carceral state.  It 
remains an open question whether all this ferment will coalesce into a broader 
movement to challenge not only the carceral state but also other growing inequities 
in the United States, including the unequal distribution of crime.  New groups have 
been forming at the state and local levels to battle various aspects of the carceral 
state, including felon disenfranchisement, supermax prisons, the abuse of 
transgender prisoners, exorbitant telephone rates for inmates, the shackling of 
pregnant women during labor, and employment discrimination against former 
offenders.
152
  A new wave of prisoner and ex-prisoner-led groups—what some dub 
the “formerly incarcerated peoples’ movement”—has been coalescing to fight the 
carceral state despite the enormous obstacles to political action that they face.
153
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A major shift may also be afoot among Christian fundamentalists, who have 
long been associated with the rise of retributive justice.  David Green suggests that 
we may be at the cusp of a new era of penal optimism as evangelical Protestants 
take up the cause of penal reform and rally under the banner of the Bible’s calls for 
compassion and forgiveness.  Leading Christian fundamentalists like Chuck 
Colson, who established Prison Fellowship in 1975 and died in 2012, and Pat 
Nolan, president of Justice Fellowship, have had strong links to the Right on Crime 
group.  But the shift among Christian fundamentalists on the crime and punishment 
question appears to run much deeper than these elite-level connections.
154
  
Since the publication of The New Jim Crow, Michelle Alexander has become 
an outspoken advocate of forging a much wider political movement to challenge 
the carceral state that goes beyond the race-centered approach she appeared to be 
endorsing in her best-selling book.  She has called for a movement that shakes “the 
foundations of our economic and social order” in order to ensure that a new system 
of racial and social control will not be erected in place of the carceral state.  In 
reflecting on the 50
th
 anniversary of the March on Washington, Alexander declared 
in 2013 that Martin Luther King “did not play politics to see what crumbs a 
fundamentally corrupt system might toss to the beggars for justice.”155 
 
XI. THE CARCERAL STATE AND CRIME 
 
The record drop in crime rates since the early 1990s in the United States is a 
major achievement that has received enormous attention.  Less noted, is that crime 
is distributed in highly unequal ways, and that unacceptably high rates of violent 
crime persist in certain urban neighborhoods.
156
  Ignoring these disquieting facts is 
like heralding the record highs of the U.S. stock market or recent gains in U.S. per 
capita income without considering trends in income distribution or poverty rates.  
No other major city except Los Angeles has a homicide rate that comes close to 
New York City’s relatively low rate of 4 per 100,000.157  Most cities have 
homicide rates that are at least twice as large as New York’s rate and, in many 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
154 Colson, a top aide of President Richard Nixon, established the Prison Fellowship in 1975 
shortly after completing a federal sentence on Watergate-related charges.  Justice Fellowship is the 
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cases, several times or even dozens of times higher.
158
  The high levels of violence 
that persist in the United States are quite exceptional when compared to levels of 
violence in other developed countries.  They raise disquieting “questions about the 
authority and the legitimacy of the state and the possibility of state failure.”159  
Since the early 1990s, the homicide victimization rate for African-Americans 
has fallen by more than half, but it remains extraordinarily high.  Extremely high 
rates of violent crime persist in some urban neighborhoods.
160
  The homicide rate 
in Chicago’s affluent Hyde Park, home to Barack Obama, is 3 per 100,000.  But 
the rate in neighboring Washington Park, which is overwhelmingly poor and 98 
percent African-American, is 78 per 100,000.
161
  The homicide victimization rate 
for young black men involved in criminally active groups in a high crime 
neighborhood on Chicago’s west side is 3,000 per 100,000 or about 600 times the 
national rate.  Put another way, this is three times the risk of stepping on a 
landmine in Afghanistan, a real war zone.
162
  
The average rate of criminal violence for black neighborhoods is five times 
that for white neighborhoods; for minority areas, it is three and a half times that of 
white neighborhoods.
163
  The homicide victimization rate for blacks is about six 
times the rate for whites.
164
  Blacks constitute just 13 percent of the population but 
half of all homicide victims.
165
  Despite the great crime drop, over 78,000 black 
males were homicide victims between 2000 and 2010.  (This figure exceeds the 
total number of U.S. military deaths during the Vietnam War by about 25 
percent.
166
  And for every black male who died of gun violence, almost another 
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available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/hus11.pdf ; see also RANDOLPH ROTH, AMERICAN 
HOMICIDE 441 fig.9.1 (2012).  
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Crime 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 1530, 2009), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w16664.pdf. 
162 Andrew V. Papachristos, Murderers, Victims Share Social Ties, CHICAGO SUN TIMES (Apr. 
15, 2011), http://www.suntimes.com/news/otherviews/2877760-452/homicide-network-social-risk-
victims.html. 
163 RUTH D. PETERSON, LAUREN J. KRIVO & JOHN HAGAN, DIVERGENT SOCIAL WORLDS: 
NEIGHBORHOOD CRIME AND THE RACIAL-SPATIAL DIVIDE 17 (2010). 
164 SMITH & COOPER, supra note 160, at 1. 
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of Criminology’s 2011 Sutherland Address, 50 CRIMINOLOGY 303, 306–07 (2012). 
166 See Murder in America, FUTURE JOURNALISM PROJECT MEDIA LAB, 
http://tumblr.thefjp.org/post/30332670020/murder-in-america-by-the-wall-street-journal (last visited 
May 16, 2015); Statistical Information about Fatal Casualties of the Vietnam War, NAT’L ARCHIVES, 
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three others suffered non-fatal injuries.)
167
  Leaving aside homicide, the violent 
victimization rate for black girls and young black women is, in many ways, 
comparable to that of their male counterparts.
168
 
Violent crime is highly stratified by race and class, but it is difficult—perhaps 
impossible—to determine which factor is more important.  With the rise in the 
number of people living in residentially segregated neighborhoods of concentrated 
poverty, the deleterious effects of growing up and living in such neighborhoods are 
now well documented.
169
  It is extremely hard—perhaps impossible—to 
disentangle the race effects from the class effects in violence because there are 
virtually no white neighborhoods as poor as the poorest black neighborhoods.
170
   
The “worst” urban neighborhoods in which whites reside are considerably better 
off than those of the average African-American community, and the most 
advantaged black neighborhoods are no better off than the typical white 
neighborhood.
171
  
                                                                                                                                                   
http://www.archives.gov/research/military/vietnam-war/casualty-statistics.html#category (last visited 
Mar. 28, 2015). 
167 Over 76,000 black males died by firearms between 2001 and 2011.  See Fatal Injury 
Reports, National and Regional, 1999–2013, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, 
available at http://webappa.cdc.gov/sasweb/ncipc/mortrate10_us.html (last visited May 14, 2015) (the 
report was produced by selecting “firearm” as the cause of injury, setting the date range as “2001 to 
2011,” setting the race as “Black,” and the sex as “Males.”).  Nonfatal Injury Reports, CENTERS FOR 
DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/injury/wisqars/nonfatal.html (last visited 
Mar. 28, 2015) (the report was produced by selecting “firearm” as the cause of injury, “Males” as the 
sex,  “2001 to 2011” as the date range, and then selecting “Race/Ethnicity” under the “Sort by 
category” option.).   
168 JODY MILLER, GETTING PLAYED: AFRICAN AMERICAN GIRLS, URBAN INEQUALITY, AND 
GENDERED VIOLENCE 8 (2008); JANET L. LAURITSEN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUVENILE 
JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, HOW FAMILIES AND COMMUNITIES INFLUENCE 
VICTIMIZATION (2003), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/201629.pdf.   
169 For an overview of this work see Patricia L. McCall, Kenneth C. Land & Karen F. Parker, 
An Empirical Assessment of What We Know About Structural Covariates of Homicide Rates: A 
Return to a Classic 20 Years Later, 14 HOMICIDE STUD. 219, 226–28 (2010); Mathew R. Lee, 
Concentrated Poverty, Race, and Homicide, 41 SOC. Q. 189, 189–206 (2000). 
170 As Robert J. Sampson and William Julius Wilson explain:  
[R]egardless of whether a black juvenile is raised in an intact or single-parent family, or a 
rich or poor home, he or she will not likely grow up in a community context similar to 
that of whites with regard to family structure and income.  Reductionist interpretations of 
race and social class camouflage this key point. 
Robert J. Sampson & William J. Wilson, Toward a Theory of Race, Crime, and Urban Inequality, in 
CRIME AND INEQ. 44 (John Hagan & Ruth Peterson eds., 1995). 
171 In not one city with more than 100,000 people do blacks reside in conditions equal to 
whites on key economic and social indicators, like rates of poverty, joblessness, and family 
disruption.  Robert J. Sampson, Urban Black Violence: The Effect of Male Joblessness and Family 
Disruption 93 AM. J. SOC’Y 348, 354 (1987).  Peterson and Krivo found that a mere 31 of over 3,000 
white neighborhoods in their sample could be classified as extremely disadvantaged compared to 
more than half of African American, Latino, and other minority neighborhoods.  See PETERSON & 
KRIVO, supra note 163, at 62.  Only 3 percent of black and Latino areas and 6 percent of minority 
areas “are privileged enough that they have no extreme disadvantages” compared to 89 percent of 
white areas.  Id. at 62.  
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XII. CRIME AND ROOT CAUSES 
 
The findings of decades of research on what explains variations in violent 
crime, especially homicide rates, are remarkably robust.  Certain structural factors 
consistently predict higher rates of homicide: larger and denser populations, 
geographic location in the South, a higher proportion of divorced males, and higher 
rates of poverty and income inequality.  Two other key structural factors that are 
related to income inequality—residential segregation and pervasive economic 
discrimination against certain groups—are likely consequential as well.172  Over 
time, the relative weight of these factors has shifted, with structural economic 
factors related to poverty and income inequality now accounting for a greater 
proportion of the variance.
173
  Differences in policing resources and strategies also 
likely explain variations in rates of violent crime, though experts do not agree on 
just how much to credit the police for sustained drops in rates of homicide and 
violent crime.
174
  
If the United States is serious about addressing these high levels of 
concentrated violence then it has to be serious about addressing the country’s high 
levels of inequality and concentrated poverty.  The only way out is to develop a 
new social and economic agenda that designates the alleviation of the 
unconscionably high rates of hunger, poverty, and joblessness that vex these 
communities a top priority, not a public policy afterthought.  This would 
necessitate an infusion of resources and new policies and programs to address 
persistent residential segregation, inadequate investments in good housing, and 
disparate access to equitable residential loans and quality public education.
175
  It 
also would entail a renewed commitment to government intervention to bring 
down the unemployment rate and to foster the revitalization of organized labor and 
collective bargaining.  All the handwringing and fatalism today about the 
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Racialized Mass Incarceration: Poverty, Prejudice, and Punishment,  in DOING RACE: 21 ESSAYS FOR 
THE 21ST CENTURY 322 (Hazel Rose Markus & Paula M.L. Moya eds., 2010).  On the importance of 
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government’s purported impotency when it comes to creating jobs obscures the 
fact that expansion of the public sector beginning in the 1960s was a key factor in 
the sizable reductions in the poverty rate for blacks.
176
    
Penal and social policies have long been two sides of the same coin in 
governing social marginality.  Increasingly, penal policy has become the policy of 
first resort to address the massive economic and social dislocations of the last half-
century and the related crime problem.
177
  The main emphasis has been on the need 
for more police and new policing strategies to enhance public safety, most notably 
COMSTAT and “hot spots” policing.  This has fomented a technicist approach that 
“depoliticizes crime prevention, by reducing it to the purely neutral scientific task 
of identifying ‘best practice.’”178  Such an approach is inattentive to the important 
political and symbolic dimensions of crime prevention and penal policy more 
generally.  
Policing enthusiasts contend that policing strategies based on the proven 
deterrent effects of swift and certain apprehension and punishment are the key to 
lowering crime rates.
179
  They have a point.  It is “surely . . . better to prevent 
people from committing crime through a visible police presence than to wait for 
them to commit it and then put them behind bars,” concedes Elliott Currie.  But it 
“is one thing to prevent crime by improving social conditions or by making people 
more capable and productive,” explains Currie.  It is another thing altogether to 
prevent crime “by frightening unproductive, desperate, and alienated people with 
the threat of arrest and incarceration if they break the law.”180  
In recent decades, the resources available to many police departments and law 
enforcement agencies escalated.
181
  This occurred largely without a commensurate 
increase in police accountability to the communities they serve.  Police and their 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
176 See Michael Hout, Occupational Mobility of Black Men: 1962 to 1973, 49 AM. SOC. REV. 
308, 311, 316 (1984); Michael B. Katz, Mark J. Stern, & Jamie J. Fader, The New African American 
Inequality, 92 J. AM. HIST. 75, 86–87 (2005). 
177 Notably, by the mid-1990s, states with less generous social welfare programs had 
considerably higher incarceration rates.  Katherine Beckett & Bruce Western, Governing Social 
Marginality: Welfare, Incarceration, and the Transformation of State Policy, 3 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 
43, 50–51 (2001) 
178 Cherney, supra note 33, at 52.  
179 See Durlauf & Nagin, supra note 174, at 38.  
180 Currie, supra note 173, at 113–14. 
181 Between 1980 and 2006, spending per capita on police quadrupled, a rise that was well 
above the inflation rate.  BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 2003, 11 tbl.1.7 (2005), available at 
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PERF Survey Shows, 23 SUBJECT TO DEBATE, Jan. 2009 at 6, available at 
http://www.policeforum.org/assets/docs/Subject_to_Debate/Debate2009/debate_2009_jan.pdf. 
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political benefactors have stridently resisted creating independent civilian review 
boards with real teeth to monitor and discipline their activities.  Many prosecutors 
have been loath to aggressively pursue charges of police brutality and other 
criminal activities by police officers.  Thanks to lucrative and highly permissive 
forfeiture laws and other measures, police departments have expanded their 
paramilitary operations, their anti-drug task forces, and other controversial 
operations.
182
  The police have also been the main foot soldiers in the war on drugs 
and in carrying out massive stop-and-frisk campaigns in certain neighborhoods.  
Additionally, they have become important players in the local enforcement of 
federal immigration policies in some communities.
183
  As a consequence, the 
police are widely viewed in many inner-city neighborhoods and elsewhere in the 
country as an occupying army unaccountable to the local citizens.  The uproar 
following the death of Michael Brown, an unarmed black teenager shot to death by 
a white police officer in Ferguson, Missouri, in August 2014 brought national and 
international attention to this issue.  
Crime prevention policies have followed strikingly different trajectories in 
Europe compared to the United States.  In Europe, they have been inextricably 
“bound up with concerns about social exclusion and urban renewal in 
disadvantaged communities.”184  The countries of the European Union have many 
more police per capita than the United States, but they also have more expansive 
social welfare programs that seek to reduce crime by ameliorating poverty and 
inequality.
185
  
For decades, conservatives have brazenly dismissed the claim that social 
welfare spending reduces crime.  Indeed, many have argued the exact reverse.  
Although the relationship between crime and spending on social welfare has been a 
hotly debated topic, research in this area is surprisingly sparse.
186
  The limited 
research available suggests that certain types of social welfare spending and 
programs reduce crime.
187
  What we do know conclusively is that states and 
countries that spend more on social welfare tend to have lower incarceration rates; 
moreover, high rates of inequality are associated with higher rates of imprisonment 
and crime.
188
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The unequal distribution of crime and the persistence of extraordinarily high 
levels of violent crime in certain urban neighborhoods is a major inequality that 
needs to be addressed.  However, as discussed earlier, in addressing the crime 
problem, we must be careful not to conflate it with the problem of the carceral 
state.  The United States needs a visionary agenda aimed at ameliorating the root 
causes of crime and other persistent and gaping inequalities in high-crime 
communities.  In the meantime, there is no excuse for keeping so many of the 
residents of these communities locked up or otherwise ensnared in the carceral 
state. 
 
XIII. BRING IT ON POLITICS 
 
The distorted narrative of the urban crisis in the 1970s—especially New York 
City’s fiscal crisis—was a vital “crucible for galvanizing new right intellectual 
activism” aimed at delegitimizing the remnants of the New Deal and Great 
Society, forging a “drop dead” urban policy, and facilitating the punitive turn.189  
In the aftermath of the Great Recession, cities may once again be poised to be the 
crucibles for the next big turn in politics and public policy in ways that have 
enormous implications not only for the carceral state but also for the future 
direction of U.S. social and economic policies.  The optimists see the 2013 election 
of Bill de Blasio as the mayor of New York’s “two cities” as a bellwether of a 
broader left-hand turn away from neoliberalism and heavy-handed law 
enforcement tactics.
190
  The pessimists look to Detroit, Stockton, Central Falls, and 
other cities forced into bankruptcy where nothing is sacred—not the pensions of 
public workers or the priceless art collection of the Detroit Institute of Arts. 
The incipient movements to challenge the carceral state and other inequalities 
in the United States certainly cannot ignore developments in electoral and party 
politics entirely.  However, they cannot bet their future on politicians and the two 
main political parties.  Establishing vibrant and independent institutions and 
organizations such as unions, women’s groups, community and immigrant centers, 
and an alternative press was key to mounting successful challenges to gaping 
political and economic inequalities in the past and will continue to be key in the 
future.
191
 
                                                                                                                                                   
Political Culture: Explaining Differences in National Penal Policies, 37 CRIME & JUST. 313, 314 
(2008). 
189 Alice O’Connor, The Privatized City: The Manhattan Institute, the Urban Crisis, and the 
Conservative Counterrevolution in New York, 34 J. URB. HIST. 333, 334 (2008).  The reference to 
“drop dead” urban policy is a takeoff on the infamous New York Daily News headline in October 
1975 after President Gerald Ford nixed a bailout plan for the city: “Ford to City: Drop Dead.”  Id. at 
346–47. 
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THE NATION, Apr. 21, 2014, at 12. 
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2015] BRING IT ON  599 
 
 
The sobering reality is that “true criminal justice ultimately awaits true social 
justice,” as Francis Cullen and Karen Gilbert once said.192  Vast and growing 
economic inequalities rooted in vast and growing political inequalities are the 
preeminent problem facing the United States today.  They are the touchstone of 
many of the major issues that vex the country—from mass incarceration to mass 
unemployment to climate change to the economic recovery of Wall Street but not 
Main Street and Martin Luther King Street.  In the face of the enormous political 
chasm between the 99 percent and the 1 percent, a strategy of elite-led, bipartisan 
deal cutting premised on calls for “shared sacrifice” leaves this grossly inequitable 
economic and political fabric intact.  As such, the 99 percent are caught in the vise 
of small-bore policies from their supposed friends and allies while their opponents 
encircle them with scorched-earth politics.   
Faced with an economic meltdown widely understood to be the result of 
breathtaking malfeasance by the financial sector and its political patrons, President 
Obama and his key advisers first singled out health care costs and the deficit as the 
leading threats to the country’s long-term economic health.  Characterizing the 
country’s economic problems this way was politically costly.  It fostered an 
exaggerated faith in the possibilities to forge productive coalitions with elite 
political and economic interests.  At the same time, it diminished interest in 
cultivating a wider political and social movement to press for far-reaching changes 
in issues ranging from mass unemployment to mass incarceration.  
The Obama administration and much of the leadership of the Democratic 
Party have taken extreme care not to upset these basic interests.  As a consequence, 
they squandered an exceptional political moment.  Likewise, the financial crisis 
and the Great Recession were one of those rare moments when many members of 
the   business sector were “stripped naked as leaders and strategists,” in the words 
of Simon Johnson, former chief economist at the International Monetary Fund.  
The Great Depression was another such instance.
 193
 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt [FDR] came into office at an exceptional 
moment in 1933.  Four years into the Depression, the Hoover administration was 
thoroughly discredited, as was the business sector.  FDR recognized that the 
country was ready for a clean break with the past as he symbolically and 
substantively cultivated that sentiment.  The break did not come from FDR alone.  
Massive numbers of Americans mobilized in unions, women’s organizations, 
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193 Simon Johnson, The Quiet Coup, THE ATLANTIC (May 1, 2009, 12:00 PM), 
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veterans’ groups, senior citizen associations, and civil right organizations to ensure 
that the country changed course.  
During the Depression, President Roosevelt was forced to broaden the public 
understanding of crime to include corporate crime.  The Senate’s riveting Pecora 
hearings during the waning days of the Hoover administration and the opening 
months of the Roosevelt presidency turned a scorching public spotlight on the 
malfeasance of the corporate sector and its complicity in sparking the Depression.  
As he put the House of Morgan and other bankers on trial, Ferdinand Pecora, chief 
counsel of the Senate Banking Committee, helped popularize during the age of Al 
Capone a term no longer heard today—the “bankster.”  These hearings compelled 
Roosevelt to support stricter regulation of the financial sector that he might not 
have otherwise.
194
   
One cannot talk about crime in the streets today without talking about crime 
in the suites.  Over the past four decades, the growing public obsession with 
getting tougher on street crime has coincided with the retreat of the state in 
regulating corporate malfeasance—everything from hedge funds to credit default 
swaps to workplace safety.  Keeping the focus on street crime was a convenient 
strategy to shift public attention and resources from crime in the suites to crime in 
the streets.
195
  
As billionaire financier Warren Buffet quipped in 2006 shortly before the 
Great Recession descended, “There’s class warfare, all right, but it’s my class, the 
rich class, that’s making war, and we’re winning.”196  The signs of victory are 
everywhere.  Income inequality rivals the Gilded Age.  The labor movement is on 
life support.  The economic recovery from the Great Recession has been highly 
uneven.
197
  Corporate profits have climbed to their highest share of the economy in 
seven decades while workers’ wages have plummeted to their tiniest share over the 
same period.
198
  Wealth has become even more concentrated than income.
199
  The 
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United States today has the largest proportion of low-wage workers of any 
advanced industrialized country.
200
  In 2011, the official poverty rate was 15 
percent, a steep increase from 12 percent a decade ago.
201
  
President Obama’s persistent calls during his first term for a politics that rises 
above politics, premised on “shared sacrifice,” denied this reality and was 
politically demobilizing.  It thwarted the emergence of a compelling alternative 
political vision on which new coalitions and movements could be forged to 
challenge fundamental inequities, including mass imprisonment and the growing 
tentacles of the carceral state.  As political scientist E. E. Schattschneider once 
said, “The definition of the alternatives is the supreme instrument of power.”202  If 
the political and economic agenda needs to be fundamentally changed and not just 
tinkered with, we should expect more “bring it on” politics, not less.  
Barack Obama is not suited to such politics by temperament or by experience.  
He rose up in the Democratic Party by cultivating powerful political and economic 
patrons in Chicago and elsewhere.  He made calls for “a politics that transcends 
politics” somehow sound transformative as he has pursued small bore solutions.  
But the problems run deeper than Obama’s personality or the constrained political 
space he reportedly occupies as the country’s first African-American president.203  
The political intransigence lavishly on display in the Republican Party that 
has repeatedly brought Congress to a caustic standstill obscures how a major 
segment of the Democratic Party is loath to mount any major challenge to the 
entrenched financial and political interests that have captured American politics 
today.  For all the bluster about political polarization, the debate over what to do 
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Nov. 25, 2013, at 14, 14–15, 17–19. 
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about the economy, the social safety net, and the regulation of the financial 
sector—like the elite discussions over what to do about mass incarceration—
oscillate within a very narrow range defined by neoliberalism and austerity 
policies.
204
  President Obama has boasted repeatedly that the federal budget for 
discretionary spending on domestic programs has shrunk under his watch to the 
smallest share of the economy since Dwight Eisenhower was president.
205
   
Leading Democrats continue to reward Republican intransigence with more 
concessions.  In 2011, Newt Gingrich succinctly summed up the Republican recipe 
for success: “I don’t think you go to the middle.  You bring the middle to you.”206  
The focus on the fratricide within the Republican Party as the establishment 
faces off against the Tea Party has obscured the deep tensions between the Wall 
Street wing and the Democratic wing of the Democratic Party.  Buying into 
austerity politics means buying into the false idea that profligate spending by states 
and municipalities was at the root of the budget crises for state and local 
governments.
207
  The primary cause was actually a perilous drop in the main 
sources of revenue for local and state governments—property, income, and sales 
taxes—as the housing bubble burst and the economy contracted thanks to Wall 
Street’s malfeasance.208  These budgetary shortfalls have been used as a pretext to 
dismantle key government functions and services or to hive them off to the private 
sector―everything from schools to health care to prisons.   
A number of progressives have sought to appear politically responsible by 
railing against the deficit and endorsing calls for fiscal constraint.  Where they 
differ from other neoliberals is that they want to make the rich pay a fairer share to 
bring the deficit down.  With some notable exceptions, progressives have generally 
been slow to mount an aggressive defense of expanding fiscal policy at a time 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
204 For a succinct analysis of just how narrow that debate was in the 2012 presidential 
campaign, see Sherle R. Schwenninger, The Missing Economic Debate: Instead of Addressing Real 
Problems, Obama and Romney Are Focusing on Deficit Reduction, THE NATION, Oct. 29, 2012, at 
29, 29–31.  On the death by 10,000 cuts of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act after Obama signed it in July 2010, see Gary Rivlin, Wall Street Fires Back, THE 
NATION, May 20, 2013, at 11.   
205 President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on Unveiling of the Budget in 
Baltimore, Maryland (Feb. 14, 2011) (transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
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206 Interview by Sean Hannity with former House Speaker Newt Gingrich, (Dec. 1, 2011), 
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207 This is a view widely promulgated by the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) 
and other conservative groups.  Contrary to these claims, state and local spending as a proportion of 
total personal income “has remained remarkably stable for decades without having ever produced 
anything close to the severe budget crisis tied to the 2008–2009 recession.”  Robert Pollin & Jeff 
Thompson, State and Municipal Alternatives to Austerity, 20 NEW LABOR F. 22, 23–24 (2011).   
208 At the same time, government expenses were growing because more people were losing 
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them over.  Id. at 24.  
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when the private sector lacks the will or the capacity to invest in ways that reduce 
mass employment and that foster enlightened social and economic policies.
209
  
The Tea Party’s histrionics have allowed the Democratic Party to postpone its 
own day of reckoning.  “As long as a majority of the GOP is hell-bent on breaking 
bad,” the Democratic Party can position itself as the “pragmatic, compromise-
seeking adult technocrats.”210  This may be a winning political strategy for the 
short term.  It is wholly inadequate, however, to address the enormous problems 
that the country faces.  It is incapable of galvanizing wide swaths of the public to 
participate in convulsive politics from below to force the dismantling of the 
carceral state and the amelioration of other gaping inequalities. 
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